On 27 December 2025, Thailand and Cambodia signed a second ceasefire agreement to halt fighting at the Thailand-Cambodia border (Wongcha-um, 2025). Following a fatal skirmish and various landmine-related incidents between May and July, fighting between Thai and Cambodian forces along the border escalated into gunfire and airstrikes (Han, 2025; Natalegawa & Poling, 2025). While Thailand and Cambodia had initially agreed to an earlier ceasefire agreement on 28 July 2025, hostilities resumed after both countries accused each other of violations (Ratcliffe, 2025).

Entering January 2026, the December ceasefire has brought some calm to the disputed border area (Ghoshal & Petty, 2026). However, both countries continue to accuse one another of violating the current ceasefire agreement. The accusations of suspected drone incursions and occupation of alleged civilian areas threaten to derail the fragile peace that currently exists (Ghoshal & Petty, 2026; Tan, 2025). 

The fragile peace hints at the complexity underlying a source of tension between Thailand and Cambodia since the 1950s. The border dispute can be traced back to agreements between France and Siam (Thailand’s previous name), which Thailand contested when Cambodia gained independence from France in 1953 (Lilja & Baaz, 2019). Significant fighting previously occurred from 2008 to 2011, when both countries’ troops had sporadic clashes after several incidents, including the announcement that the Preah Vihear Temple, which sits on disputed territory, was added to the World Heritage List following a request by Cambodia in 2007 (Fabris, 2024). The 2025 escalation thus marked the deadliest clash between the two countries since the 2008-2011 crisis (Natalegawa & Poling, 2025).

Today, there is still no single factor that can fully explain the escalation in the Thailand-Cambodia border dispute. Increased nationalist sentiments might be fuelling escalatory rhetoric from senior Thai officials, such as Army Chief of Staff Gen Chaiyapruek Duangprapat, who has emphasised the need to “render Cambodia militarily ineffective for a long time – for the safety of [Thai] children and grandchildren” (Im, 2026; Petty, 2025; Strangjo, 2025). Both countries have historically used border disputes to rally popular support from domestic populations (Ngoun, 2018; Rattanasengchanh, 2017). In addition, increased tensions after former Cambodian leader Hun Sen leaked a phone call between him and Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra – sparking outrage and political chaos in Thailand – was cited as an escalatory factor (Suriyasenee & Ruser, 2025). Cambodia’s assertive stance despite its military disadvantage also suggests that Cambodia might have wanted to take advantage of Thailand’s current political instability to portray a show of strength, deflect from domestic challenges such as slowing economic growth and the proliferation of scam centres, and push for territorial claims more forcefully (Alderman, 2025; Suriyasenee & Ruser, 2025). Finally, Thailand’s efforts to crack down on Cambodian scammers – a revenue stream for Cambodian elites – when Thailand-Cambodia relations were already fraught, might have contributed to the escalation (Michaels & Laksmana, 2025; Suriyasenee & Ruser, 2025).

It is clear that the historical and domestic baggage behind the current Thailand-Cambodia border crisis makes it difficult to resolve. However, more than 100 civilians and soldiers have either been wounded or killed (Al Jazeera, 2025), and hundreds of thousands of civilians have also been displaced from their homes (Head, 2025). The December ceasefire agreement is a hopeful step forward in peaceful negotiations, aiming to ensure Thailand and Cambodia can continue to engage each other diplomatically rather than militarily to avoid another protracted military standoff similar to the 2008-2011 crisis.