The Review: Africa Edition II

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‘Stalemate in the Western Sahara’: How Regional Rivalry and Global Power Politics obstruct the path to Sahrawi statehood

By: Arissa Kamaruzaman

Deep within the arid desert of the Western Sahara is a sand wall that divides Moroccan-controlled areas in the west from Polisario Front-controlled areas in the east. Spanning 2,700 km, the Berm is considered one of the longest operational military barriers in the world (McNeish, 2015). Yet, the Berm’s existence, and the protracted conflict it emerged from, remains largely unknown on the international stage. 

In 2020, the conflict in the Western Sahara—deemed to have frozen over since the end of the Western Sahara War—saw a violent rekindling, when Polisario Front forces and Moroccan forces violated the 1991 ceasefire (Sun, 2024). While the conflict is currently classified as a low-intensity one, the deterioration of tensions between Morocco and the Algeria-Polisario Front bloc and the UN’s continued ineffectiveness in resolution ultimately point to a non-negligible prospect of escalation.

This article argues that the stalemate in the Western Sahara results from the intersection of three dynamics: a hasty decolonisation process by the Spanish, Moroccan-Algerian rivalry in the Maghreb region, as well as global economic and political alliances which favour the Moroccan claim to sovereignty. 

Who are the Sahrawi peoples? 

The Sahrawi people are an Arab-Berber ethnic group who live within the Western Sahara. They hold close ties to Beni Hassan, a Bedouin tribe which migrated to the Western Sahara between the 11th and 14th centuries (USCRI, 2025). They thus speak the native language of the Beni Hassan tribe, which is Hassaniya Arabic. 

Prior to the period of Spanish colonisation, the Sahrawi people organised themselves in nomadic tribes. The harsh environment of the desert shaped this way of living, where they “migrate[d] over vast areas in search of pastures for their animals” (Hodges, 1983). 

Within the tribe (qabila) itself, Sahrawi individuals had their own tribal factions (fakhd) (Hodges, 1983). Their loyalties were also primarily aligned with their tribe, tribal factions, and their families. It was through this tribal structure that they were then able to form assemblies and councils, as well as appoint political, military, and judicial leaders. 

Throughout the evolution of the conflict, however, the Sahrawi people’s own unique conceptions of sovereignty have been ignored. Instead, their demands have been overshadowed by those of larger powers, be it neighbouring Morocco and Algeria, or the US and European states, forcing them to appeal to a Westphalian framework of sovereignty so as to access a limited degree of negotiating power. 

A Historical Overview of the Western Saharan Conflict

From 1884 to 1975, the Western Sahara was known as the Spanish Sahara. Up till the 1930s, Spanish presence was limited mostly to coastal military garrisons, where some fishing groups lived (Drury, 2013). In the 1940s, however, one of the world’s largest phosphate deposits was discovered at Bukra’—territory inland that the Sahrawis held ties to (Drury, 2013). The shift in the locus of Spanish colonial rule thus directly uprooted the Sahrawis’ way of life, as they were instead thrust into exploitative structures of colonial administration. Many people within the tribes worked in phosphate mining and road construction, with profits accruing to the Spanish empire. 

It was the end of WWII that provided the impetus for decolonisation. This was reflected in the UN's decision to roll out Resolution 1514 in 1964 (Security Council Report, 2020), urgently requesting Spain to decolonise the Spanish Sahara. The war’s drainage of resources, as well as the souring of international opinion towards the status of empires made the decolonisation process inevitable in various colonies—including that of the Spanish Sahara. However, the actual process of decolonisation was carried out in a hasty manner, lacking genuine commitment by the Spanish colonisers.

For Morocco and Mauritania, the laissez-faire attitude of the Spanish colonisers meant that the spoils of empire within Sahrawi territory were for the taking. Morocco laid claims to the territory, on the basis of continuous historical sovereignty that preceded the period of Spanish colonisation. In particular, Morocco established that Sahrawi territory was a part of Southern Provinces that made up a “Greater Morocco”. Drawing on the Islamic concept of bayaa, Morocco asserted that Sahrawi tribes held strong legal ties with Moroccan sultans, when they paid allegiance to these sultans (ICJ, n.d.). Similarly, Mauritania claimed that the Sahrawi tribes were part of the Mauritianian entity prior to Spanish colonisation (ICJ, n.d.). 

However, Moroccan and Mauritanian claims of defending territorial integrity merely functioned as a facade for covert, strategic and economic interests, which will be discussed later on. In 1975, the ICJ outrightly rejected Moroccan and Mauritanian claims to the Western Sahara, citing that it did not find existing ties of territorial sovereignty for either country (ICJ, n.d.). Instead, the ICJ repeated its urge toward Spanish decolonisation and a path to Sahrawi self-determination. This was in line with the objectives of the Polisario Front, the Sahrawi nationalist movement founded in 1973. 

The ICJ verdict was met with displeasure by Morocco, which viewed the absorption of Sahrawi territory as central to its expansionist project. To demonstrate Morocco’s resolve in annexation, the Moroccan king organised a mass demonstration of around 350,000 unarmed Moroccans into the contested territory—an event which would later come to be known as the Green March (White, 2014). The Green March, however, proved to be a strategic success for Morocco. At the time, Spain was undergoing a transition from the Franco regime, thus favouring domestic restructuring to entanglement in foreign conflicts. In the wake of Spain’s domestic political crisis, the Green March was a timely intervention to force Spain to enter the negotiating table. Since Morocco and Mauritania agreed to preserve Spanish presence in the Bu Cra’a mines, Spain ceded to the Moroccan-Mauritanian plan for administrative control (Weiner, 1979). Evidently, the end to Spanish colonisation did not mark an end to the subjugation of the Sahrawi peoples, for Morocco and Mauritania would now perpetuate the same exploitative structures of administration for their economic gain. 

Against the backdrop of Moroccan and Mauritanian annexation, the Polisario Front thus embarked on a guerrilla war, or the Western Sahara War (1975-1991), to assert its territorial sovereignty. Mauritania withdrew its claim in 1979, while Morocco persisted in its claim throughout the war. Beyond mere military confrontation, Morocco embarked on the construction of the Sand Wall (1980-87) to manipulate the “facts on the ground” in favour of its Western Saharan annexation. On the diplomatic front, Morocco withdrew from the Organisation of African Unity in protest of the organisation’s recognition of the legitimacy of the SADR.

Algeria played a crucial role in this war, in its provision of extensive military and financial aid for the Polisario Front forces. To an extent, the conflict can thus be viewed as a proxy war for Algeria. The backing of Polisario Front forces was driven by Algerian desires of checking Moroccan hegemonic control in the Maghreb (Joffé, 2010). However, I analyse the legitimacy of this claim further in the section on “Regional Rivalry and Global Power Politics”. 

In September 1991, the conflict officially came to an end by way of a UN ceasefire and the creation of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). Since the end of the conflict, however, subsequent proposals by the UN for the Sahrawi question have borne no fruit. Instead, the demarcation of Western Saharan territory remains ambiguous, emboldening Moroccan expansionism. 

In 1999, the Baker Plan I offered a framework for Western Saharan autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, which would later be followed by a referendum for self-determination. Since this framework did not fulfil the Polisario Front’s aims of immediate self-determination, the organisation rejected the proposal (Security Council Report, 2020). In 2003, the UN rolled out the Baker Plan II, which stipulated 5 years of Sahrawi self-rule, before a referendum would be held with choices for independence, Western Saharan autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, or full integration with Morocco (Security Council Report, 2020). Just as the Polisario Front had earlier rejected the Baker Plan I, the Moroccan government rejected Baker Plan II. The option for independence clashed with Morocco’s vision of Western Sahara as a part of a larger Moroccan polity. Ultimately, the failure of both proposals set the foundations for a longstanding stalemate in negotiations that have not been resolved up to now. 

Morocco’s Western Sahara Autonomy Proposal 

Morocco first put forth its autonomy proposal before the UN in 2007. Claiming its historical ties to the region, Morocco seeks to consolidate the region as part of its borders. Within this proposal, the Sahrawis are guaranteed “exclusive powers” within “legislative, executive and judicial bodies” (United Nations Security Council, 2007). In contrast, Morocco will harbour control over “defence, external relations and the constitutional and religious prerogatives of His Majesty the King” (United Nations Security Council, 2007).  

From Morocco’s perspective, the proposal assures long-term regional security alongside economic integration. Through administering defence matters, Morocco will be able to curtail political instability in the region. Moreover, by guaranteeing Western Sahara’s integration into the Moroccan economy, this may spur more investments into renewable energy projects, reaping significant gains in sustainable development. 

Recent developments

In November 2020, the ceasefire collapsed when Polisario protests and Moroccan forces clashed over a key trade route at Guerguerat (Sun, 2024). Since then, Morocco’s claims to territorial sovereignty in the Western Sahara have appeared, more than ever, to be within reach. Several countries recognise Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara, in light of their own strategic economic or political interests in the region. 

The Trump administration, for instance, formally recognised Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara in December 2020, in exchange for Morocco’s normalisation of relations with Israel (Yerkes & Triche, 2025). Both the Biden administration and the current Trump administration have retained this policy. In March 2022, Spain took a similar position, by deeming the Moroccan autonomy proposal  to be the “most serious, realistic and credible” means of resolving the dispute. In October 2024, France joined both the US and Spain in endorsing Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara. 

Most strikingly, in October 2025, the UN Security Council passed a resolution that encourages negotiations based on Morocco’s autonomy proposal (United Nations, 2025). Rabat would retain control over defense and foreign affairs in the region. Whereas, local Sahrawi institutions would experience autonomy in legislative, executive and judicial affairs. This proposal effectively sidelines the Sahrawi movement’s calls for independence. 

In April 2025, US Secretary of State Mark Rubio reaffirmed the US’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara and its autonomy proposal (United Nations Security Council, 2025). In June 2025, the UK became the third member of the UN Security Council to support the Moroccan autonomy proposal, joining the ranks of US and France. However, the UK has adopted a more guarded stance, by simultaneously favouring Morocco’s autonomy proposal in a joint communiqué signed with Morocco and regarding the status of the Western Sahara as “undetermined” (Brooke-Holland, 2025). Nonetheless, Morocco perceives the UK’s stance as a major diplomatic win for Rabat, in that it has fundamentally consolidated Western support for the Moroccan autonomy proposal (International Crisis Group, 2025). 

As the consensus towards the Western Sahara’s status tilts in Morocco’s favour, the conflict has become far removed from the genuine interests of the Sahrawi people, and instead rooted in the geostrategic interests of regional and global powers. 

Moroccan and US hardliners have also recently pushed for a discreet means of resolving the conflict (International Crisis Group, 2025). Instead of operating within the framework of UN mediation, these hardliners have called for the dismantling of the MINURSO and removing Western Sahara from the list of non-self-governing territories. Additionally, they have advocated for labelling the Polisario Front a terrorist organisation. While neither the US nor Moroccan government have taken these views into serious regard, the extremity of these views have raised alarm in the European Union and the UN. Officials in both organisations have warned against labelling the Polisario Front a terrorist organisation, so as to prevent fuelling an intensification of the conflict. 

Against a backdrop of frozen negotiations, the Polisario has conducted high-profile rocket attacks in Mahbes and Smara in 2024 and 2025 (International Crisis Group, 2025). Morocco has relied on drones to demonstrate its aviation capabilities, while avoiding full-scale retaliation (International Crisis Group, 2025). Younger activists in the Western Sahara have intensified their calls for the use of force against Morocco, in turn questioning the effectiveness of the Polisario’s diplomatic strategy (International Crisis Group, 2021). 

Conceptualisations of Sovereignty in the Western Sahara

At the heart of the conflict lies a fundamental disjunct in the conceptualisation of sovereignty between that of nomadic peoples and the UN’s Westphalian model (Joffé, 2010).

The nomadic lifestyle, which involves travel across various terrains, does not imagine territorial sovereignty along fixed borders (MacKay et al., 2009). Instead, territory is linked to the fluidity of space—-be it the fluidity of resources accessed for survival, or the fluidity of allegiances that the Sahrawi tribes tie themselves to within the desert. Ultimately, it is not the demarcation of land per se that is crucial to their struggle for self-determination, but their strong, cultural ties to the land’s provisions. 

Under the Westphalian model of sovereignty, however, territory is demarcated along fixed borders (MacKay et al., 2009). Morocco has benefitted largely from this model of sovereignty, with its creation of a tangible land border in the form of the Sand Wall. In order to gain negotiating power within the international community, the Polisario Front has resorted to a framework of sovereignty that is more aligned with that of the Westphalian model, with its formation of a military apparatus and a central government (Joffé, 2010). 

Yet, the fact that the Polisario Front cannot achieve its objective of self-determination even within the Westphalian model points to a second issue: the disjunct between external sovereignty and internal sovereignty (Joffé, 2010). Where external sovereignty ensures the state’s freedom from interference, internal sovereignty ensures the state’s freedom to govern within its own borders. In the case of the Western Sahara, the UN’s focus on external sovereignty has paved a dangerous precedent for Moroccan expansionism. For instance, the aforementioned land border established by Morocco is a display of Morocco's external sovereignty, in its deliberate attempt to thwart the infiltration of Polisario Front forces into Moroccan-controlled phosphate mines. Crucially, sovereignty is increasingly subjective and determined by an international audience like the member states of the UN, who all hold their own personal biases, rather than functioning as a genuine, internal expression of power. 

Weber’s concept of “simulated sovereignty” expands further on the UN’s flawed delimitations of sovereignty: sovereignty is not an ontological status, woven into a state’s existence, but rather is a result of continued practice. In other words, the state is not sovereign because it has an inherent right to the territory it stands on, but because it simulates that act of standing on territory (Weber, 2009). Stronger states like Morocco are thus able to repeatedly assert their claims to land, and by extension, their “simulated sovereignty”. In the Western Sahara, Morocco engages in this act through both economic and political means. The Berm, for instance, was constructed during the Western Saharan War to tangibly limit the infiltration of Polisario Front forces into key resource zones, in turn preserving Morocco's economic access to these zones.  Since 1975, Morocco has also sponsored resettlement schemes into the Western Sahara, such that Moroccan settlers now account for nearly two-thirds of the Western Saharan population (Cheng, 2024). Through historically continuous attempts, Morocco has indeed “simulated” its sovereignty over Western Saharan territory. 

From the legal perspective, the territorial status of the Western Sahara harbours several ambiguities. There is a lack of consensus regarding Western Sahara’s administering power on the UN list of non-self-governing territories (Bouris & Fernández-Molina, 2024). While Spain had declared itself exempt from responsibility over the territory’s administration in early 1976, the Polisario Front, legal scholars and 2014 decree from the Spanish National Court have argued that Spain remains the de jure administering power due to the nullified 1975 Madrid Accords  (Bouris & Fernández-Molina, 2024). In contrast to this view, US and EU representatives have contended that Morocco should be acknowledged as the de facto administrator of the territory. 

Furthermore, UN discourse on the Western Sahara has steered away from sensitive discussions on occupation law  (Bouris & Fernández-Molina, 2024). The only reference by the UN General Assembly to occupation law was in 1979 and 1980, when the Assembly passed two successive resolutions following Mauritania’s withdrawal and Morocco’s takeover of the southern half of the territory in 1979 and 1980. During a visit to the Western Sahara in March 2017, then Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon controversially termed Morocco’s presence in the region as an occupation. This immediately drew censure from the Moroccan government, which accused the UN of abandoning its position of neutrality. In retaliation, Morocco expelled most of its MINURSO response from the Western Sahara. In order to appease the Moroccan government, Ban Ki-Moon reverted to the UN’s previously held stance that the status of the Western Sahara was undecided—refraining from the terminology of  “occupation”. The politicisation of language detracts from international legal opinion that Western Sahara is under occupation by Morocco. In other words, the UN’s lack of recognition towards the case of occupation highlights how even the UN has to toe the line between neutrality and pragmatism, in its aim of halting the intensification of conflict. 

Political Economy of the Western Sahara 

Natural resources function simultaneously as a driver of geopolitical competition and an instrument for diplomatic negotiation for Morocco. Wehmann argues that the presence of rich natural resources enables “recurring cycles of armed conflict”, for it creates a “revenue base for belligerents”, “claims for secession”, and “incentives for corruption and mismanagement” (Wennmann, 2011). The significant phosphate reserves provides Morocco with access to profitable, natural resources, so much so that it has become the world’s largest exporter and third-largest producer of phosphate rock (Mills, 2023). Morocco has thus been able to utilise its access to Western Saharan phosphate reserves as diplomatic leverage with countries within the region and beyond. 

For the Western Saharans themselves, the discovery of the Bukra’ amounted to the formation of an “environmental imaginary” (Davis, 2013). Through the framework of an “environmental imaginary”, Western Saharans are more cognisant of the untapped natural resources of their land and empowered to productively utilise those resources for their own economic growth. For instance, Western Saharans embarked on protests outside the Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP) headquarters in 2016, which is a Moroccan-owned phosphate company (Western Sahara Resource Watch, 2016). During these protests, Western Saharans condemned the OCP’s practice of excluding Western Saharans from employment, in spite of the OCP’s exploitation of Western Saharan phosphate reserves. Morocco’s designs on these resources thus mobilised Sahrawi resistance in defence of their "environmental imaginary”.  

Gains in the phosphate trade have shaped a policy of “tacit acceptance of Morocco’s authority” (White, 2014), trumping ideological positions that would have otherwise recognised Sahrawi self-determination. For instance, while many African states actually backed the SADR in response to Morocco's violation of self-determination, some have recently altered their positions along economic lines, such as Burundi, Madagascar, India and Mauritius. 

At the same time, the Atlantic shelf off the Western Sahara provides rich fishing grounds for Morocco, boosting the blue economy. The approval of the Protocol to the EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA) in 2013 drew flak for guaranteeing Morocco direct access to waters off Western Sahara (Lecha & Escriche, 2025). Since the EU countries would enjoy increased fishing opportunities in Moroccan waters, the immediate question of Sahrawi self-determination was neglected in favour of economic gains found in these contested waters. Most recently, in September 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) annulled the renewed FPA, ruling that the FPA’s lack of prior consent of the Sahrawi peoples was a violation of international law (The Fisheries Secretariat, 2024). Whilst the court ruling has upheld hope for the right of the Sahrawi peoples to self-determination, the growing economic interests of international actors within Sahrawi territory means that future territorial incursions are near-inevitable—be it in the form of legal workarounds or direct violations of international law. 

Regional Rivalry and Global Power Politics 

The changing regional and international political order also has significant implications on Sahrawi self-determination. 

Tensions between Morocco and Algeria that arose from the colonial period have persisted not only during the Western Sahara War, but within the current, low-intensity conflict. In light of the ambiguous borders drawn by the French, Moroccan nationalist leaders have staked claims on “lost provinces” within Western Algeria (Joffé, 2010). Algeria, on the other hand, “has built its international reputation on its revolutionary legitimacy” (Joffé, 2010), from its war for independence (1954-1962) and the leading role it played within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). As such, Algeria is a strong proponent of self-determination as the path to independent statehood. This is evidenced from its repeated contests to Moroccan expansionism, from the Moroccan-Algerian War of the Sands (1962) to the Western Saharan War (1975-1991). Through the Western Sahara dispute, Algeria’s backing of the Polisario Front allows it to check Morocco’s designs on regional hegemony. 

Morocco has long perceived the Polisario Front to be a proxy for Algerian interests (International Crisis Group, 2025). Over the past two decades, Rabat has consistently demanded that negotiations be conducted in a roundtable format that includes both Algeria and Mauritania. Algerian involvement is assumed to be a prerequisite for an eventual agreement to Morocco’s autonomy to Moroccan plan. During his speech for Throne Day in July 2025, King Mohamed VI extended an olive branch to Algeria, calling for dialogue that would enable a mutually acceptable solution to the Western Sahara (Maroc.ma, n.d.). Rather than Algeria responding to this symbolic move, it was Polisario that responded with its insistence that dialogue be centred on Sahrawi self-determination. As such, whether the Polisario is truly an Algerian proxy can be questioned. 

However, it must be noted that “the prospect for a full-blown war between the two neighbours remains unlikely in the short term” (Lefèvre, 2016). Both countries are strategic allies of France and the US, sharing common threats such as the prospect of Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks. In addition, previous experiences of the Sand War and Western Saharan War have imprinted upon both countries that further hostilities will only lead to the “costly prospect of a mutually hurting stalemate” (Lefèvre, 2016). 

In recent years, the Western Saharan conflict has become internationalised. In order to win the contest over regional hegemony in the Maghreb, both Morocco and Algeria have had to diversify their political and economic alliances with other countries, so as to gain legitimacy over their respective positions in the conflict. 

Crucially, the US’s strong relations with Morocco have strengthened the latter’s claims to the Western Sahara. The 2020 US’ recognition of Moroccan sovereignty highlights how the question of sovereignty was utilised as a means to an end, rather than judged objectively through historical and legal evidence. Moreover, the US has long preserved a strong partnership with Morocco, so as to combat terrorism in the Maghreb. The Moroccan autonomy proposal thus appears to be the most feasible solution for the US, by entrenching Morocco’s presence in the Maghreb and countering the infiltration of radical groups in the Western Sahara, as well as the influence of China and Russia (Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2005). 

For Algeria, its attempts of alliances with China and Russia have been less successful. During the Cold War, Algeria “sought Moscow’s support on Western Sahara as a concession in exchange for assistance to their allies of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola”(Lecha & Escriche, 2025). Hence, the USSR representative supported the Western Sahara people’s right to self-determination in the vote for UNSC Resolution 377. Beyond this diplomatic quid pro quo, the Soviets did not actively object to Moroccan territorial incursions within the Western Sahara. Instead, the USSR signed a phosphates and fisheries agreement with Morocco in 1977 and 1978 respectively (Lecha & Escriche, 2025). In fact, the latest deal between the two countries, which was renewed in 2024, allows 10 Russian vessels to fish in Western Saharan waters with an annual quota of 140,000 tonnes of fish (Lecha & Escriche, 2025). Similar to the aforementioned annulled EU-Morocco FPA, the Russian-Moroccan deal raises questions of legal legitimacy—-violating the Sahrawi’s self-determination in the waters off Western Sahara. The contested sovereignty over both land and water in the territory has emboldened international players to exploit legal ambiguity to their advantage. 

In a similar vein, several Chinese SOEs have engaged in the illegal purchase of phosphate rock in Western Sahara between 2018 and 2021 (Lecha & Escriche, 2025). In 2023, China and Morocco also signed a deal to cooperate in distant-water fishing and agriculture (Lecha & Escriche, 2025). Yet, China has had to undertake a careful balancing act in its economic and ideological interests, with its overarching African policy being one that upholds self-determination of African peoples. Rather than aligning with the Polisario Front’s quest for self-determination, China has chosen to adopt a policy of non-interference—framing the conflict as Morocco's domestic affair. It was only during the 2023 joint Sino-Algerian communiqué that China joined Algeria in reaffirming the commitment to  UN efforts that would be capable of guaranteeing the Sahrawi people the path to self-determination (Lecha & Escriche, 2025). 

Road to an Escalation of Conflict 

The Sahrawi’s path to self-determination has grown narrower, in the wake of weak UN negotiations and growing hostilities between Morocco and the Polisario Front. 

Other than the fact that the UN has failed to propose a solution to the Western Sahara amenable to both Morocco and the Polisario Front, the expulsion of dozens of UN staff and the closure of the MINURSO’s military liaison office saw its credibility take a major hit. This occurred after Ban Ki Moon, the UN Secretary General, termed Moroccan presence in the Western Sahara to be an “occupation” (Lefèvre, 2016). 

Since Mohammad Abdelaziz—the Polisario Front’s historical leader—died in May 2016 (Al Jazeera, 2016), Brahim Gahli has since taken over the reins of leadership. Many young Sahrawis perceive the Polisario’s diplomatic strategy to be ineffective and have demanded for an intensification of attacks. Hamdi, a youth leader in the Polisario, highlights this view (Armstrong, 2018): “When our fathers were fighting against the Moroccan occupation, the whole world, and especially, the UN, were listening to Polisario. But not now. Either we get our land back or we go back to war.” Whereas, Morocco has accumulated both its diplomatic and economic firepower to legitimise its claims to the Western Sahara. In doing so, it may radicalise the Polisario Front further, culminating in an all-out conflict. 

The campaign by US and Moroccan hardliners to label the Polisario Front as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) is equally dangerous in this regard. These allegations are based on circumstantial claims that the Polisario Front holds links to Iran and Hezbollah (International Crisis Group, 2025). For example, the late 2024 claim that Syrian rebels entering Damascus had apprehended a group of Polisario fighters who were defending Bashar al-Assad, an Iranian and Hezbollah ally, was tied to a single document allegedly recovered from the headquarters of an Assad regime intelligence agency. However, to date, no legitimate evidence has been found of Sahrawis being held in the new Syrian authorities’ custody. 

Mechanisms for Peace 

Subject to hasty decolonisation, regional rivalry and global power politics, the Western Sahara is more than just an arid desert cocooned from the wider world. Indeed, the 2020 violation of the ceasefire demonstrates the prospect for violent, military escalation within the Western Sahara. 

On the immediate front, international and regional actors should back UN-led efforts to de-escalate tensions by calling upon Polisario to suspend all armed activities and for Morocco to withdraw its forces to positions held prior to 13 November 2020 (Mundy & Lovatt, 2021). 

For further progress to be made at the negotiating table, the UN members have to  regard both Morocco’s and Polisario’s claims on an equal basis—-envisioning a just and lasting solution to regional security. This would involve revising the Westphalian framework of sovereignty in a manner that respects both claims to internal and external sovereignty. Rather than favouring Morocco’s claim to external sovereignty in its maintenance of the Berm, the UN has to consider Western Saharan claims to internal sovereignty, namely in its right to govern within its own borders. 

In contrast to the Moroccan autonomy proposal, the Polisario Front has proposed a UN and African Union-supervised referendum that would reaffirm the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination (United Nations Security Council, 2025). Should the referendum lead to independence, the Sahrawi state affirms that it is ready to negotiate with the Kingdom of Morocco on establishing mutually beneficial relations in the Western Sahara. According to the Sahrawi proposal, the Polisario Front is open to engaging in economic integration efforts with Morocco, which includes joint ventures and a revenue-sharing formula for natural resources. Notably, the Polisario Front is “open to negotiating with the Kingdom of Morocco regarding the continued utilisation of the infrastructure for the extraction and exploitation of natural resources… for a period of 5 years, subject to renewal by mutual agreement” (United Nations Security Council, 2025). 

However, it must be acknowledged that the Polisario Front’s proposal faces key practical obstacles. The definition of Sahrawi people remains unresolved, which impacts the ability of the Polisario Front to define voter eligibility criteria for the referendum. It is uncertain whether Moroccan settlers who arrived after 1975 would be included in the referendum, as well as whether the population’s makeup should be determined based on 1974 Spanish census data (American Journal of International Law, 2021). 

This poses the question as to whether a middle ground between the Moroccan autonomy proposal and Polisario Front’s referendum proposal can be achieved. In the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 1541, it is stipulated that the people of non-self-governing territories can attain self-determination through three means: independence, integration or free association. 

In the Western Sahara crisis, one of the judges who issued the 1975 ICJ ruling that ceded administrative Moroccan and Mauritanian control to Western Sahara, had actually cited free association as a possible measure for self-determination. The Cook Islands, for instance, is a self-governing state in free association with New Zealand. Under this framework, Cook Island enjoys self-rule, while New Zealand retains primary responsibility over external affairs and defence. As such, this framework would align with the current power delegation that has been established under the Moroccan autonomy proposal, while ensuring that the Sahrawi state is fundamentally separate from that of Morocco (Mundy & Lovatt, 2021).  

For the free association agreement to be implemented, a referendum would be conducted for the people of the Western Sahara. Should the proposal fail to secure required majority support, the UN could implement a second referendum based on a revised free association agreement. 

Hassani, a Sahrawi activist, underscores the difficulty of Sahrawi people in even expressing self-determination (Nedrebo, 2025): “Gatherings are banned, waving the Sahrawi flag can be treated as a crime. We are constantly monitored. Many endure physical assaults simply for giving testimony. Our voices are silent unless we echo the official Moroccan narrative.” Similarly, Yougiha Milay, a Sahrawi refugee, echoes Hassani’s view in her dream of returning to the Western Sahara (Nedrebo, 2025): Sahrawis have endured “the longing for home and the challenge of rebuilding a life from nothing”.

While empowering local, regional and international actors to search for alternative frameworks for peace, the interests of the Sahrawi people must not be ignored. Rather, the aforementioned actors have to rise beyond their rigid political and economic interests, before entering into a middle ground for a long-lasting peace.