The Review: Southeast Asia Edition II

---

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI): Past, Present, and Future

By: E-Shean Yong

The Southeast Asian terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), voluntarily disbanded on 30 June 2024. While there is much research on individuals who voluntarily disengage from terrorist groups, less is known about the factors driving entire terrorist groups to voluntarily disengage from their use of violence, as well as about how such terrorist groups evolve after disbandment. Therefore, this case study aims to (a) explore internal and external factors that led JI to disband; (b) explore internal and external factors that could drive JI’s future evolution; and (c) highlight the uncertainties that could change/influence the direction of JI’s evolution.

‘The case of the Indonesian JI suggests that the path away from violence may not always be through military destruction or follow a negotiated settlement. At times, groups that have embraced jihad may recognize that armed action is too costly in their local context, and it needs to be placed on hold’ (Matesan, 2022).

JI focused on building a counter-society, with the goal of establishing an Islamic State in Indonesia, and later Southeast Asia, through the use of violent means.

JI emerged as a breakaway group from the Indonesian Darul Islam (DI) network. DI started as an Islamist rebellion during Indonesia’s early independence period from 1945 to 1949, was defeated in the early 1960s, but DI activists continued to promote the vision of an Islamic state in Indonesia (Matesan, 2022). Some of these DI activists, such as Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, received jihadi training in Afghanistan, then formed JI with the intention to use jihad to establish an Islamic State first in Indonesia, and expand into the rest of Southeast Asia in the future (Matesan, 2022). The early experiences of JI’s leaders, as well as JI’s conceptualisation as both Indonesian and Southeast Asian, meant that JI was both a national entity and a transnational entity (Matesan, 2022). While JI’s transnational element enabled its members to develop from overseas training with other jihadi groups, its multiple operational centres also prompted strong coordinated responses from states, especially after the 9/11 attacks. This effectively incapacitated JI in Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, forcing JI to narrow its focus to Indonesia (Matesan, 2022).

Instead of insisting on a physical territorial state, JI focused on building a counter-society, which could amass sufficient resources and develop a strong enough organizational structure to transform into a counter-state (Matesan, 2022). This was seen most clearly in JI’s pursuit to establish multiple madrasahs, as well as build funding organisations. For example, JI has been using non-profit organisations and open donation platforms such as Syam Organizer, One Care Indonesia, and Baitul Maal Abdurrahman bin Auf to facilitate terrorism financing; and as early as 2013, JI had already used other non-profit organisations such as Al-Haramain Indonesia Foundation, KOMPAK, and Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia to support terrorist operations (Khoirunnisa, 2025).

JI was especially active in the period after Sungkar’s death in November 1999, when deep fragmentation and weak leadership in the organisation enabled high-level terrorist attacks by factions and splinter groups (Matesan, 2022). 

Over time, JI’s ideology and motivations have shifted away from violent jihad.

Institutionally resilient but militarily dormant (Abuza, 2024).

Interestingly, JI leaders started condemning terrorist attacks by 2004, and shifted tactics to focus exclusively on proselytizing and capacity building in 2007 (Matesan, 2022). Matesan (2022) and several others argued that this was not an ideological renouncement of violence, but a pragmatic reassessment of strategy in the Indonesian and global context. Indeed, as early as 2010, JI scholars had already started noting how above-ground organisations were making more progress in spreading Islamic State ideals than covert organisations like JI (Satria, 2024).

Especially since 9/11, other terrorist jihadi groups, including al Qaeda, were arguing for global jihad. However, the main arm of JI, keen to avoid over-extending its base of operations, chose to focus on national (i.e. in Indonesia) and regional jihad. This was unlike other Indonesian terrorist groups and JI splinter groups, who were keen to pursue global jihad. As a result, JI seemed to stop receiving resources from global jihadi groups such as al Qaeda (Schoon, 2020).

In addition, since 2007, Indonesia’s counter-terrorism operations, spearheaded by Detachment 88, have had success in incapacitating JI’s activities even in Indonesia itself. For example, a 2007 government raid in Poso, a JI stronghold, resulted in the arrest of then-JI leader Zarkasih and effectively ended the JI’s military activities there (Matesan, 2022; Satria, 2023). By 2023, JI members also accounted for 59% of all arrested terrorist suspects; this figure had been 8% in 2019. While Indonesia’s counter-terrorism efforts have been heavy-handed in pursuing JI individuals, they have also been engaging in dialogue with JI through the National Counterterrorism Agency (Abuza, 2024). This provided JI with an exit window to pursue peaceful means, rather than fighting militarily to the last breath as is often seen in the case of other jihadi groups who are not given the chance to exit violence.

Interestingly, Zarkasih’s arrest in 2007 allowed Para Wijayanto to become JI’s leader in 2009. Wijayanto restructured JI to prioritise dawah (preaching) and internal cohesion, while also continuing military training for selected members. For example, by 2014, JI was sending members to Syria for military training, while also operating palm oil plantations in Sumatra and Kalimantan, and conducting regular dawah sessions with university students. By mid-2019, JI was said to have 6000 members across Indonesia, including some who were active in government institutions (Chew, 2023; Satria, 2023). 

JI’s ability to self-reflect on external factors, carefully consider the local and global context, and focus on its original goal of building a counter-society is perhaps most clear in its final decision to disband in June 2024. This decision came after careful consideration over several years. 

Despite JI’s structural disbandment, JI’s conceptualisation of an Islamic State continues to exist:

‘JI has ceased to exist as a structure, but not as a set of ideas’ (Ismail, 2025).

Since the announcement of the disbandment in June 2024, JI leaders, especially Wijayanto, have pledged loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia, have realigned school curriculums to follow orthodox teachings, and set up initiatives such as Rumah Wasathiyah to guide former JI members away from extremism (Anindya, 2025; Ismail & Tang, 2025).

In a positive sign that JI’s disbandment could lead to long-term peace, JI leaders have faced little resistance from JI members while visiting various strongholds in Indonesia to explain the decision to disband (Satria, 2024). In addition, the North Sumatra wing of JI also announced its decision to follow the main arm of JI in disbanding (Gunawan, 2025). These moves show JI leaders’ strong influence over the JI network as a whole.

However, the same cannot be said about JI’s splinter groups and lone wolves who act on the basis of JI ideology. Mainstream JI members, especially those recruited during Wijayanto’s leadership, went through strict disciplinary programs that train them to obey JI leadership; such training is absent in JI’s factions and splinter groups (Satria, 2024). JI still continues to exist as an ideology as well, even if it is no longer a formal structure; such an ideology could still be used by radical individuals to justify their violent acts.

JI has a history of splintering and internal dissent due to its loose structure. For example, Noordin Top’s splinter group was one of the more violent JI cells. During a 2019 re-strategising meeting, some senior JI members also disagreed about whether JI should stop using violence to achieve its goals (Satria, 2024). JI also still has members abroad, around 10 in Syria and 20 in Yemen (Soufan Center, 2024). Keeping in mind that JI first formed as a breakaway group from DI, while most analysts agree that JI splinters will take time to form (Satria, 2024), there is a real uncertainty here as to whether another violent jihadi group will form as a breakaway group from JI, with similar goals to JI.

Furthermore, there is lack of transparency around JI’s economic assets since its disbandment, raising concerns that JI’s disbandment could be a strategic maneuver rather than genuine disbandment (Ismail, 2024). This suggests that JI could pursue new approaches to gaining influence, some of which may or may not be perceived as a threat to Indonesian state institutions.

Finally, to the public eye, much of JI’s moves towards peaceful dawah and proselytizing appear to rest on the leadership of one man, Wijayanto (Ismail & Tang, 2025). The organisational hierarchy of JI is still opaque to most, and will continue to remain so due to the disbandment. It is therefore unclear to what extent the current period of peace rests on Wijayanto’s ability to maintain leadership of JI, and who within JI leadership could be more in favour of a return to violence.

In summary, while JI leaders have committed to disbandment and a shift away from violence, uncertainties remain regarding the development of (a) violent splinter groups, and (b) peaceful forms of JI influence that could nevertheless be perceived by state institutions as a threat to state existence.