The United States and Israel have had a close security relationship ever since the end of the Six-Day War in 1967. Israel is currently the largest recipient of American military aid, having received over $244 billion between 1946 and 2024. Israel is also a Major Non-NATO Ally under U.S. law, and American policy of maintaining its qualitative military edge (QME) is enshrined in law. This level of support demonstrates the close relationship between Israel and the United States, with the U.S. providing Israel a strong security guarantee due to their shared foreign policy aims, a higher level of public support than that of any other Middle Eastern ally, and the historical strategic importance and volatility of the Middle East. 

A Change in Circumstances 

However, ever since the war in Gaza broke out on October 7th, 2023, there has been a sharp divergence in Israel’s foreign policy alignment with the United States. The September 2025 Israeli airstrike on Qatar violated the sovereignty of a U.S. ally and put American credibility at stake. The Israeli invasion and bombardment of Syria since December 2024 have damaged the U.S.’s efforts to stabilize the country and withdraw its troops there. Israel’s bombing of Iran started the twelve-day war in June 2025 and scuttled American efforts for a new nuclear agreement. At the same time, its brutal conduct in Gaza has derailed the Abraham Accords and dragged US popularity underwater globally. All of these has put at risk the key framework that has pinned the U.S.’s foreign policy in the Middle East. That is ensuring Arab-Israeli normalization, contain Iranian influence, and securing broader stability in the region to prevent mass economic disruption in trade flows of crucial resources like oil, as a disruption in the Middle Eastern oil trade causes a rise in global oil prices that negatively affects American consumers and a Presidential administration’s popularity. 

Domestically, the current level of support has become untenable. A September 2025 NYT/Sienna poll shows that 35% of Americans sympathize with the Palestinians vs 34% for Israelis, a record high for the Palestinians since the question was first asked in 1998. Additionally, 51% of voters oppose sending additional military aid to Israel, in contrast with 39% in support, with independents and democrats disapproving more heavily. Meanwhile, between October 7th, 2023, and June 7th, 2024, there have been nearly 12,400 pro-Palestine demonstrations, in comparison to 2,000 pro-Israel demonstrations in that time period, with many of the pro-Palestinian protestors being motivated to take to the streets due to anger at U.S. support for Israel in the war in Gaza, demonstrating that there is significant public and activist pressure on U.S. foreign policy makers to take in mind the human rights concerns of the Palestinians. The change in domestic public opinion led to the U.S. to eventually push and then successfully negotiate a ceasefire in the war in Gaza despite U.S. leaders being initially opposed to the option early on in the war. 

Strategically, US investment in Israeli security and the broader Middle East is growing increasingly costly to US grand strategy. During the Israel-Iran war, the US blew through 25% of its supply of THAAD missile interceptors in 12 days, which is around 100-150 missiles. Given that the US acquired 11 interceptors in 2024, the gap in the US missile defense network will take a long time to recoup, which comes at a precarious time when the U.S. is trying to balance its commitments in Ukraine and Taiwan. Additionally, carriers have been diverted from Asia to the Middle East to address the aftermath of October 7th, with the number of carrier days spent in the Pacific dropping from 471 to 400 between 2023 and 2024, while the number in the Middle East spiked from 58 to 328 and in 2025, the USS Nimitz and its strike group was deployed away from the South China Sea towards the Arabian sea due to the Israel-Iran war. All of this is taking place while the Middle East has become less critical due to the Shale revolution, which transformed America from an Oil importer to an Oil producer. All of this means that the diversion of military resources away from Asia to the Middle East due to America’s security commitments with Israel is posing a challenge to American grand strategy in the Pacific and lacks the strategic reasoning that justified it historically. 

Regardless, Israel remains a key ally for the United States. The United States benefits from joint research and weapons development with Israel, such as Arrow interceptors. Israel is also a major buyer of American weaponry. As of April 2025, America has 751 active foreign military sales, with Israel valued at $39.2 billion, which helps sustain manufacturing jobs in the United States, a key concern for American lawmakers ever since the First Trump Administration. Israel is also currently a regional hegemon in the Middle East, with the strongest and most competent military in the region. Regarding Iran, the U.S. and Israel are on the same page, and hence Israel can serve as an American bulwark against Iranian influence. 

Therefore, the United States should take a new approach to its relationship with Israel, shifting the relationship from patron to partner, rather than risk a complete break in relations. This opinion piece argues that the United States must take the following policy steps to ensure that the U.S.-Israel relationship can survive the new challenges that have arisen since October 7th, which have made current U.S. policy unsustainable. 

A Delicate Balancing Act

First, the United States should recognize a Palestinian state, reverse its recognition of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights as Israeli territory, and re-engage with the peace process on a two-state solution. This policy aims to do several things, one of which is to align the United States with the views of the global community. By aligning with the International community in this way and not hindering international recognition of a Palestinian state, the United States can help to repair its reputation globally, especially in the Global South. The aim is to inform their publics that the U.S. is concerned with the well-being of Palestinians. Another point is that this policy has relatively little cost on the U.S.-Israel alliance, while it is very likely that such a move would receive instant condemnation from Jerusalem, the reality is that many of Israel’s security partners in both the Middle East and abroad already recognize a Palestinian state. Yet, Israel did not cut off ties over it. Additionally, Israel’s current international isolation makes it more dependent on the United States to help represent its positions abroad. Hence, the U.S. has an opportunity to define the terms of the relationship on its own terms. Finally, this policy would also help satisfy domestic pressures from activists and the public for a more empathetic U.S. policy supporting Palestinian self-determination, giving policymakers breathing room on other aspects of the relationship. 

Second, the United States should gradually phase out U.S. aid to Israel over 10 years and repeal the QME policy from law, while keeping Israel’s status as a major non-NATO ally. This policy would help achieve several objectives, including serving as a good public relations move for both domestic and international audiences critical of American military support for the IDF. 

Currently, the QME policy means that if the United States wishes to conduct an arms sale to a country in the Middle East, it must offset it by providing additional arms to Israel to ensure that the Israeli military maintains its military edge over other Middle Eastern militaries. By repealing the QME, the United States would not need to commit more resources to the Middle East than necessary, allowing the U.S. to shift resources outside the region. Additionally, this policy helps to maintain U.S. manufacturing jobs, as Israel’s retention of non-NATO ally status allows it to retain priority access to military orders in the United States. Since Israel still relies on American weaponry for its armed forces (especially its air force), it would still be willing to pay out of pocket for further weapons for the short to medium term. Phasing out aid over 10 years also gives Israel time to realign its arms industry to prevent a sudden gap in the IDF’s stockpile, while reassuring allies that the United States remains a credible security partner and isn't willing to end important security relationships abruptly. Significantly, this policy shifts the cost of Israeli military actions away from the United States towards Israel, which forces the Israeli government to consider less costly, more diplomatic options to secure itself, helping to alleviate the concerns of America’s other Middle Eastern allies who fear that Israeli military action in the region is destabilizing their own security. 

Finally, the United States should still align with Israel on key issues to deter Israeli policymakers from shifting out of the U.S. security infrastructure. There is a real risk that the first two policies could severely alarm Israeli policymakers so much that they seek to acquire new partners abroad and lessen American leverage over Israel. Hence, the U.S. should still align with Israel on specific issues. One is that the United States should still maintain its position when it comes to the ICJ and ICC cases against Israel and its leaders. The U.S. should also work to expand the Abraham Accords and foster U.S.-Arab-Israeli collaboration in countering the Axis of Resistance. By not changing their stance on the ICC and ICJ cases, U.S. Policymakers throw a bone towards the Israeli government, allowing it to argue to its public the importance of maintaining the U.S.-Israel relationship, even with the first two policy changes recommended before, as many Israelis see the cases as an offensive insult.  Israel’s foundation as a nation born from the holocaust is important to its national identity, so the fact that the state born from that genocide is being accused of committing the same crime as the Nazis is seen as an insult by many Israelis. A show of solidarity by the United States prevents the Israeli public and government from being completely alienated against the U.S. Additionally, a successful prosecution would embolden ICC prosecutors to charge more Western leaders with war crimes, including American leaders for war crimes in Afghanistan, and the American public and politicians are likely to oppose sending U.S. military commanders to a foreign court to face trial, giving a strategic reason to oppose the case. Finally, by committing to expand the Abraham Accords and foster U.S.-Arab-Israeli cooperation against the AOR, the United States can help maintain the anti-Iranian bulwark in the Middle East. 

October 7th, 2023, is a day that changed the Middle East forever. As the region changes, it makes all the more sense for American policy to change as well, to modernize the current U.S.-Israel relationship and ensure it can meet the challenges and realities of the 21st century.