Violence in Southern Philippines: Will Complete Peace & Democracy Remain Elusive?

Summary

Before the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) was signed in 2014, the Mindanao administrative region in Southern Philippines was the site of a decades-long conflict involving indigenous Moro Muslim armed groups and the largely Christian Philippine central government. 

Since the CAB was signed, the region has experienced greater relative peace, and some progress in developing democratic political mechanisms.

However, there remains some uncertainty on whether the Mindanao region will continue to experience greater peace and stability in the coming years. There are some signs of continued sporadic violence in the region, and the development of democratic political mechanisms remains uncertain.

The Decades-Long Conflict: 1968 to 2014

While the Muslim Moros traditionally comprised distinct clans and distinct ethno-linguistic backgrounds, their common Islamic faith, in addition to the shared experience of marginalisation, enabled the development of a collective Moro identity.

The Muslim Moros in the Southern Philippines were systematically marginalised, first by Spanish and American colonial powers, and later by successive Philippine governments, all of which had policymakers with Western and Christian-leaning views (Lindsey & Steiner, 2025). 

In the early years of Philippine independence after World War II, the Philippine central government encouraged North Christian Filipinos to migrate to the Southern Philippines. These Christian Filipinos occupied lands that historically belonged to the Muslim Moros, creating tensions between the Moros and Christian Filipinos, as well as Moros’ grievances towards the central Philippine government (Lindsey & Steiner, 2025).

The flashpoint marking the start of the decades-long conflict between Moro Muslim armed groups and the Philippine central government is said to be the string of massacres perpetrated by both elements of the Philippine government and the Christian extremist group Ilaga during the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, in the 1968 Jabidah massacre, young Moro recruits were killed by members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines after they had allegedly refused to train and demanded to go home (Lindsey & Steiner, 2025). In the 1971 Manila Massacre perpetrated by the Ilaga and the Philippine Constabulary, more than 60 Moro civilians were killed at a mosque (Bangsamoro Information Office, 2023).

Moro separatist elements emerged from these violent years, culminating in the formation of the armed group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), in 1972. The MNLF’s stated goal was to form a fully secular independent state for all Moro people through armed struggle (Lindsey & Steiner, 2025).

There were multiple attempts at peace agreements between 1972 and 2014, but all were unsuccessful. For example, in 1976, the Tripoli Agreement was signed between the MNLF and the Philippine central government, whereby thirteen provinces in Southern Philippines would be formed into one autonomous region. However, the Philippine central government, under President Ferdinand Marcos, later reneged on the Agreement by forming two autonomous regions comprising only ten out of the original thirteen provinces, leading to a breakdown in peace and continuation of violence. In 1996, the MNLF and the Philippine central government signed a new peace deal, the Tripoli Peace Accord, that promised the Moros some form of limited regional autonomy. By then, the MNLF had split into factions, and one of its more prominent splinters, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), rejected the Tripoli Peace Accord, and demanded for an independent Muslim state governed by Islamic law. Therefore, prior to 2014, no significant peace agreement lasted because at least one stakeholder would either renege on the agreement, or outright reject and derail the peace process (Lindsey & Steiner, 2025).

After the Signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014

When the CAB was finally signed in 2014, the MILF’s armed wing promised to decommission and lay down their weapons, while the Philippine central government promised to create the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), and provide socio-economic aid to reintegrate the combatants who had laid down their arms (CNA, 2024). The Bangsamoro Organic Law – the legal instrument to implement the CAB (Lindsey & Steiner, 2025) – and Bangsamoro Transitional Authority were also subsequently established, in 2018 and 2019 respectively. 

However, these successes are not without setbacks. Passing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law initially stalled due to the deaths of 44 Philippine soldiers after a firefight with MILF fighters in January 2015, before being successfully passed in 2018 (Lindsey & Steiner, 2025). In addition, the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority was supposed to be an interim authority that would be replaced by candidates from an election that has been postponed multiple times, with the election currently slated to be held on 14 September 2026 (Bacelonia, 2026). It has also been more than ten years since the CAB was signed, but the MILF has yet to fully decommission, and decommissioned combatants also claim that the Philippine government has provided incomplete aid thus far (CNA, 2024).

In light of these setbacks, sporadic violence also continues. For example, in January 2025, armed men allegedly linked to the MILF attacked Philippine army soldiers (Sadongdong, 2025).

Uncertainties Moving Forward

Moving forward, three key uncertainties lay ahead that could further threaten the peace process in the BARMM.

Firstly, there is the emergence of splinter groups. The examples above show that armed groups in the Southern Philippines have a very strong tendency to splinter (Plank, 2017). Other splinter groups that have not already been mentioned but have contributed significantly to the violence include the Abu Sayyaf group and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters. Some of these splinter groups also aligned themselves with the Islamic State, adding complexity to peace enforcement efforts in the area (Lindsey & Steiner, 2025). 

Second, the Southern Philippines is also the location of clan-based conflicts, known as rido. As recent as June 2020, 12000 civilians were displaced due to a land dispute between two families (Trajano, 2020). Rido are usually caused by land ownership disputes or political rivalry, and could escalate into continued reciprocal violence (Trajano, 2020). Besides creating demand for weapons in the region, rido also creates an unhealthy culture of violence, and some belligerents might even align themselves with extremist groups for extra military weight (Trajano, 2020). Alarmingly, violence that comes about due to rido has largely been ignored while most stakeholders have focused on achieving peace and political progress with armed groups such as the MNLF and MILF (Trajano, 2020). Political rivalries amongst clans already exist within the BARMM administration (Teehankee, 2025), and the tensions could intensify and even escalate into violence in the run-up to the 2026 elections (Xu & Bertrand, 2025). As MILF commanders reintegrate back into society and participate in the political process, Xu and Bertrand (2025) even highlight a possibility that MILF commanders engage in armed confrontations against each other, as a proxy of local politicians.

Third, most of the attention has been focused on the reintegration of male combatants into society, with little focus on female combatants. This is significant as the MILF does have an all-female unit, the Bangsamoro Islamic Women Auxiliary Brigade (BIWAB), who have generally been excluded from the political process thus far while the rest of MILF undergoes a rebel-to-party transformation (Palik & Usop, 2025). As a result, the women from BIWAB may not necessarily have access to channels where they can articulate their interests in a political, non-violent manner (Palik & Usop, 2025). Thus far, strong internal cohesion within BIWAB and some external support has allowed BIWAB to organically transition into a socio-political entity, the League of Moro Women Organization Inc (LMWOI), with the ability to advocate for women’s interests in the BARMM Regional Plan on Women, Peace and Security (2023-2028) (Palik & Usop, 2025). However, the LMWOI also appears to struggle with consensus-based decision-making, and retains a hierarchical structure with dominance by ex-commanders that may still limit access to political participation (Palik & Usop, 2025). If not addressed, some of these women might be compelled to seek other ways outside the existing political system to express their interests and needs, to the detriment of the development of democratic citizen participation mechanisms in BARMM.

Conclusion & Recommendation

The uncertainties ahead show that the violence in Southern Philippines is not monolithic and not perpetrated by a single actor. As such, any conflict resolution mechanisms and solutions should also be flexible and adaptable in nature. 

Besides the implementation of the already-delayed 2026 Bangsamoro parliament elections to ensure continuation and progress in the development of BARMM into a truly autonomous region, there could also be more efforts to consolidate a map of the different causes of conflict in the area, and implement flexible justice mechanisms to tackle the violence. 

One promising example could be the use of traditional dispute resolution (TDR; Yusoph, 2025). Rather than focusing on enforcing a rigid justice framework and rigid outcomes, TDR emphasises the importance of pursuing a restorative, consensus-oriented process to repair social fractures. In the area of Lanao del Sur, one of the provinces in the BARMM, TDR is frequently initiated by local actors, such as traditional mediators and barangay (the smallest administrative division in the Philippines) officials, who are able to offer rapid, context-specific responses to halt violence and reduce social tensions (Yusoph, 2025).

Finally, any political process, including the development of conflict resolution mechanisms, should include diverse groups, such as women, to ensure that such groups feel included in the BARMM political system, and are not compelled to seek alternative routes to make their voices heard.