The fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024 transformed Syria into a vacuum, pitting interests of regional powers against one another. Nearly a year later, Türkiye, Israel, Iran, and the Ahmed al-Sharaa government continue to champion competing visions for Syria’s future.

Turkey emerged as the primary external stakeholder in post-Assad Syria. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government has positioned itself as the main partner for Syria's reconstruction and political transition.

According to Türkiye's National Security Council statement from November 26, Ankara expressed satisfaction with Syria's progress in overcoming challenges pledging continued support to achieve stability across Syrian society (Turkish Directorate of Communications, 2025). The council emphasized there is no room for terrorism or violence in the region's future, representing a main security interest for the Erdogan government’s continued interest in Syria.

Ankara demands the dismantling of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which Türkiye views as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Dr. Oytun Orhan of ORSAM explained Türkiye's strategy as exerting maximum pressure on the SDF via military operations and diplomatic channels, having just appointed its first ambassador to Syria in over 13 years (Anadolu Agency, 2025) .

However, Türkiye firmly opposes any federal or decentralized system that would grant autonomy to the northeastern Kurdish-majority. This would represent a major conflict of interest with local organisations and political actors affiliated with Ankara in the region. Hassan Mohammed Ali, head of the SDC’s public office, stated multiple times in his recent visit to the UK that the solution remains a federal decentralized government,  calling for intervention from Western allies.

Israel's actions in Syria since Assad's ouster fall within what it has defined as "active defense". In the immediate aftermath, Israel conducted approximately 480 airstrikes within just 48 hours, targeting military installations, chemical weapons facilities, and strategic infrastructure. The IDF simultaneously moved into the UN-monitored buffer zone in the Golan Heights, violating the 1974 Disengagement Agreement (Atlantic Council, 2025). Israel now controls Mount Hermon, just 40 kilometers from Damascus, providing commanding regional surveillance. Airstrikes have continued throughout 2025, with Israel justifying them as protection for the Druze minority and willing to hold Al-Sharaa personally responsible for any threat to Israel.

Israel has also directed its air power towards Tehran, mobilising diverse intra-regional grievances in Syria as a proxy battleground for conflicting interests.

Syria was the linchpin of Tehran's "Axis of Resistance," providing a critical land bridge for weapons supplies to Hezbollah. As of January 2025, Syrian officials have banned Iranian citizens and goods from entering, accusing Iran of supporting Assad loyalist insurgents. Despite this reversal, Iran has not abandoned efforts to maintain influence. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has reportedly established contacts to secure protection for Iranian diplomatic facilities and Shia shrines (Manara Magazine, 2025). Iran now finds itself reliant on Turkey and Qatar as intermediaries to maintain dialogue with Syria's new leadership. 

Syria remains trapped in a dangerous limbo. The country has become an arena for proxy competition. While Türkiye has been perceived as using Syria to eliminate security threats and expand regional influence, Israel has sought to establish military positions and eliminate Iranian presence amidst Tehran’s drive to maintain its presence as a regional force.

Syria's future thus depends less on their own political negotiations than on whether regional powers can agree to respect Syrian sovereignty, amidst a latent threat of the country fragmenting into competing spheres of influence.