The start of December 2024 saw the demise of one of the most notorious regimes in the Middle East. An offensive in North-Eastern Syria by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) snowballed into a national uprising that ended over 50 years of Assadist rule. Despite welcoming the fall of Assad, the Israeli state has embarked on a widespread airstrike campaign against what remained of the regime’s conventional arsenal. As the bombs fell, Israeli troops seized the Area of Separation in the Golan Heights, a clear violation of the 1974 agreement that had created a demilitarised zone between the 2 states. So, what has incentivised these actions in Syria?

The main answer is security. The 7 October attacks shattered Israeli perceptions of their country as a “Villa in the Jungle”, separated and relatively safe from wider events in the Middle East. The attacks have reinforced a view within Israel that if the country wishes to retain its notion of absolute security, it must seek to mitigate and protect against not only current risks but also future threats. Writing for the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies, Israeli Maj. Gen (Reserve) Gershon Hacohen called for a revision of Israeli strategy that would involve and put greater emphasis on “active involvement in the space beyond the borders”. This would seek to project Israeli power and interests onto developments happening outside its borders, seeking to reduce future threats to Israeli national security.

It was following this ethos that the current set of actions was taken. The IDF and Netanyahu both realise that the new reality in Syria may not evolve in line with their own security interests. The creation of a stable government is still far from certain and a Syria in anarchy would, in their view, prove to be a serious threat to Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights. Israel fears that the old regime’s vast array of weaponry, especially its chemical arsenal, could be turned against it by radical Islamist factions. This worry incentivised Israel to conduct an extensive and intensive airstrike campaign against the ex-regime’s military assets, conducting 480 strikes on air bases, ports and other facilities in the span of just 48 hours. Meanwhile, Israel’s incursion into Syria itself, apart from securing a wider buffer zone, seeks to inject the country as a major foreign player in Syria’s future. The capture of the strategic Mount Hernon, itself only 40 kilometres from Damascus, allows Israel to more readily project its power and influence into Syria as well as Lebanon itself. This could allow the country leverage in ensuring, for example, Iranian supply lines are not re-established within the new Syria. Given the fact that the IDF is constructing new military bases in the buffer zone it now controls, it seems that Israel seeks to cement its current position for the long-term.

Whether these latest actions will lead to greater security for Israel is far from certain. However, what is clear is that the ones to suffer are once again the Syrians themselves. In what was supposed to be a year where Syria looked towards a brighter future, the country finds itself with yet another external power intervening in its affairs. Resentment and anger can build quickly. In trying to protect and mitigate future threats, Israel may only have assisted in their creation.