On 30 January, March 23 Movement (M23) insurgents captured Goma, the largest city in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The M23 offensive has since accelerated pushing into Bukavu. Instability in the DRC prevails as disorganized Congolese troops continue to retreat.  

During the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, thousands of Tutsis fled Rwanda to neighboring countries; specifically, Uganda and Zaire. Following the 1994 Rwanda Patriot Front’s (RPF) victory, Hutu extremists fled Rwanda organizing militias in the Eastern DRC. In 1996, Rwanda, aiming to protect ethnic Tutsis from the Hutu militias, with Uganda, Angola, and Burundi, invaded the DRC, sparking the First Congo War. Recurrent instability led to a second Rwandan-led invasion in 1998.  

Hostilities have continued. Rwanda has sponsored Tutsi militias such as the CNDP. In 2012, M23, CNDP offshoot, launched an offensive which captured Goma. Following a negotiated settlement with the Congolese government, M23 retreated. M23 has continued using captured mines to export rare earth minerals. In 2021, M23 took up arms again claiming the previous 2012 peace agreement had been broken.  

The recent acceleration of the M23 offensive risks internationalization of the conflict. Rwanda’s support for M23 is well documented and received UN condemnation. 

Before the current offensive, the Congolese army requested Ugandan assistance in repelling Islamist militias in the Northeast DRC. Since M23’s capture of Goma, Uganda has deployed personnel to more northeast villages. While Uganda claims to be fighting Islamists, they have also been accused of also supporting M23. Burundi has also deployed troops to fight M23; however, after recent confrontations, Burundian troops retreated. Troops have remained deployed on the Burundian border retaining the possibility of another intervention. South Africa has also committed significant forces to aid the Congolese government. The conflict is turning into a broader African war.

In February, South Africa threatened war with Rwanda if attacks on South African forces continued. An underlying motivator of international intervention in the DRC has been Congo’s mineral wealth. A key driver of M23 support has been control over rare earth minerals crucial for electronics. Similarly, South Africa has key mineral interests throughout the DRC which explains its position.  

Globally, the US, UK, and EU have significant leverage over Rwanda through billions in foreign aid. The EU and US have been unwilling to act given lucrative rare earth mineral deals with Rwanda. As trade tensions between China, the rare earth mineral exporter, and the West increase, Congo’s resources will become geostrategically vital.

Importantly, Rwandan mineral exports rely on M23’s control over Congolese mines. Similarly, China, to diversify from domestic mining, controls 70% of the DRC’s mineral wealth and has sold high tech drones to the Congolese military to fight the insurgency. However, the UK has halted aid agreed to through the migrant deal because of Rwandan support for M23. Not all UK aid has stopped demonstrating British reliance on Rwandan minerals. As international interests intertwine, the probability of further escalation increases exponentially.