The Russo-Ukrainian war has been the biggest conflict on European soil since World War II. Although imminent peace prospects remain unlikely, war fatigue has sparked on both sides (Walker, 2024). Ukrainian resources are depleting themselves at an unsustainable rate, jeopardizing the ability of the country to maintain a favorable position in the conflict (Massicot, 2024). If NATO wants to survive as a protective alliance and securitise the European continent, it urgently needs to refresh its response to Russian aggression. This paper recommends that NATO increases its ammunition and weapon systems support to Ukraine, notably to enable an attack on Crimea. Whilst this counteroffensive intervention requires grit from NATO, it is the only option to disable further Russian aggression in Ukraine and Europe. 

Background 

Since 2022, Russia’s ‘special military operation’ has caused the death of over 70,000 Ukrainian soldiers and 10,378 civilians (UN, 2024), while also pushing another 6 million to flee abroad (UNOCHA, 2024). US intelligence reports estimate that Russian casualties amount to 315,000 (Al Jazeera, 2024). Since mid-2023, Russia’s military strategy has focused on capturing specific towns and settlements (Nelson, 2024), while Ukraine has prioritised air defense - in particular drone attacks - and sought opportunities to use long-range missiles (Posaner et al., 2024). Russia controls 17.5% of Ukraine, which now also includes the city of Avdiivka (Brown, 2024). Ceasefire or negotiation settlements are unviable options (Chatham House, 2023) as Putin continues to exhibit no desire to engage in diplomatic talks (Havrylov, Maksak, and Kelly, 2023). Moreover, the looming possibility of nuclear warfare remains with Russia repeatedly referring to its use against Ukraine and the West (Kelly and Faulconbridge, 2024). 

NATO’s interest in preserving a rules-based international order (Chatham House, 2023) has dragged the alliance into a de facto proxy war with Russia (Cordesman, 2022). NATO has provided unprecedented support to Ukraine on financial, military, diplomatic, and humanitarian grounds (NATO, 2024a). Between 2022 and 2024, the alliance has supplied 200 billion dollars worth of support to Ukraine (Kiel WP, 2024) including weapons, equipment, artillery, assistance with humanitarian and non-lethal aid, and multi-year assistance programs to transition Ukraine to meet NATO standards (NATO, 2024a). Nevertheless, Ukraine is currently facing serious shortages in ammunition and artillery (Rumer, 2024) while also struggling to form their manpower (Bowen, 2024; Reynolds and Watling, 2023). As the Ukrainian Minister of Defense warned, the Ukrainian army is limited to fire 2,000 artillery shells a day, leaving many areas of the front unprotected (Jankowicz, 2024; Watling, 2024). In addition to already having military and technological superiority (Stoner, 2022), the Kremlin draws on authoritarian allies to support its war effort (Aydintasbas et al., 2024). Moreover, Russia’s defense industry continues to grow, currently at about 30% of total government spending (AFP, 2024). 

NATO Member States are divided in their support for Ukraine. France and the UK push to send more aid, while Hungary and Slovakia disapprove of such policies (Cafiero, 2024). President Emmanuel Macron is ramping up the rhetoric, demanding some European states to ‘stop being cowards’ while simultaneously refusing to let go of the possibility of deploying Western troops in Ukraine (Parry, 2024). Although more than 16,500 sanctions have been imposed by the West on Russia (BBC, 2024a), policymakers and observers are doubting their impact on the conflict (Bowen, 2024; Crowley, 2022). The European Union (EU) is now considering the use of frozen Russian assets for military support and the reconstruction and development of Ukraine after the war (Kiderlin, 2024). Although Ukraine will, according to NATO, join the alliance someday (NATO, 2024b), against the current background of continued warfare it is difficult to imagine its imminent ascension to Member status (Havrylov, Maksak, and Kelly, 2023). The US Congress’ decision on the 20th of April 2024 to add an additional 61 billion dollars in aid to Ukraine reinvigorates the chances of a successful NATO support campaign (Tait, Greve, and Micheal, 2024). However, the possibility of Donald Trump’s reelection in November also presents a potential challenge as his isolationist policies - if reflected at the level of NATO's commitments - may undermine the Euro-Atlantic unity and influence his desire to reduce or withdraw American aid to Ukraine (Havrylov, Maksak, and Kelly, 2023). 

A victorious Ukraine is necessary for NATO to prevent the Kremlin from being made ‘bolder by success’ and putting at risk other European states' sovereignty (Giles, 2022). Indeed, various intelligence agencies (Danish, German, Estonian) have warned of the high risk of Russian invasion in the Eastern flank of the alliance once it has restored enough military power to do so - within six to nine years - (Mölling and Schütz, 2023). This risk materialised since Putin announced his plan to double Russian troops along the border (Mackinnon, 2024). Thus, to securitise a territory that now encompasses Finland and Sweden (BBC, 2024b), NATO has been conducting its largest military drills since the end of the Cold War, involving 90,000 troops spread across NATO's eastern flank (Reuters, 2024). However, work remains to be done to ensure a swift response from the alliance in case of Russian aggression on NATO territory, especially in terms of training troops and rearmament (Posaner et al., 2024). Moreover, there are political and cultural dimensions to the conflict that could generate further risks, especially in the international geopolitical order (Cafiero, 2024), as this conflict could resonate among authoritarian regimes or states in the Global South who ought to vindicate themselves from Western colonialism (Frye, 2021; Kassymbekova and Marat, 2022). US President Joe Biden stated in this respect that Russia’s war in Ukraine is not just a regional threat, but a threat to the rest of the world (The White House, 2023). 

In two years of conflict, Russian aggression in Ukraine represents a major source of both conventional and nuclear insecurity for the alliance’s Member States. Russia has been effective in transitioning to a full-scale war economy and in circumventing sanctions. Against the background of the divisions within NATO and the clear and present danger of further uncontrollable escalation, NATO must identify an optimal policy scenario to react promptly to the conflict and renew its strategy for 2024. 

Policy options 

1. Increase ammunition and weapon systems support to Ukraine in view of a strategic counter-attack on Crimea  

The first policy option entails making drastic support maneuvers for Ukraine. In the context of an increasingly divided NATO (and a potential upcoming isolationist US), this initiative would rely on core European NATO Member States (France, UK, Italy, Germany) coupled with the support of Poland and Czechia (for their military capability). NATO should establish long-term contracts with European armament manufacturing companies (for instance Rheinmetall [DE], BAE Systems PLC [UK], Leonardo [IT], and Saab [SE]) to supply Ukraine with 15mm ammunition, arms, and drones (Chatham House, 2023). It would also include the commitment of larger transfers of the existing stock of weapons systems in particular long-range missiles (for example the TAURUS KEPD 350 or the SCALP-EG Storm Shadow or MGM-140 ATACMS). This operation would enable a strategic counter-attack, possibly leading to the liberation of Crimea.  

The current state of affairs shows that reinforcing Ukrainian defense is unavoidable for NATO as without renewed material support the country will be vanquished within a couple of months (Mills, 2024). Committing to bigger transfers of the existing residual stock of long-range missiles in particular will allow Ukraine to ‘pound Russian logistics and air bases well behind the front lines, undermining its ability to keep attacking’ (Posaner et al., 2024). Moreover, supplying these missiles would allow Ukraine to carry out a critical attack on Crimea in 2025 which could end the conflict due to its geostrategic location and value to the Russian military (Michel, 2023). This option is based on the assumption that regaining the peninsula would be ‘the only practical way any peace plan could succeed’ (Finnin, 2023).   

Despite its advantages, the cost of this policy option would be accepting and amplifying the rift between NATO Member States that are willing to keep supporting Ukraine and those that are not. Additionally, some political stand-offs, especially coming from German chancellor Olaf Scholz who has so far shown reluctance to supply Ukraine with Taurus missiles in fear of fueling escalations in the conflict, may slow down this whole process (Financial Times, 2023). 

1. Strengthening NATO’s flank countries  

NATO could alternatively respond defensively, by reinforcing its eastern flank against conventional threats, especially in the context of Putin doubling Russia's troops along the border (Mackinnon, 2024). In Member States such as Romania (especially with the risk emerging from the region of Transnistria and Putin’s desire to restore Novorossia [Le Bec and Ségur, 2023]), Baltics, Poland, Finland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary, NATO could increase its deployment of stationed soldiers across the border, doubling from the current 40,000 (NATO, 2024a). Additionally, NATO could organise larger and swifter cross-border movements of weapons (Reuters, 2024), lead a wide range of training programs, and bring support to their intelligence services. For partner countries such as Georgia, Moldavia, and Azerbaijan, NATO’s intervention could limit itself to military espionage: either the identification of useful individuals to collaborate with or the intoxication of their current intelligence services in case of Russian infiltration. 

This policy option assumes that Member States’ resistance against NATO’s aggressive posture will persist and possibly increase with the Trump Presidency. The value of a preventive posture is to focus on NATO’s weakest and most exposed regions in case of Russian invasion (Weaver and Kendall-Taylor, 2024). It fosters ‘permanent reassurance’ in Eastern European Member States (Dempsey, 2017) and provides a strong message of commitment to their security. Moreover, this operation would allow the reinforcement of NATO’s position as a defensive alliance, not seeking escalations with Russia (Clapp, 2022). 

Nevertheless, the main drawback of this policy option is that prioritising the defense of NATO's eastern flank means focusing on the second line of conflict, rather than giving natural priority to reinforcing the first line which is Ukraine itself. Ultimately this could undermine NATO's overarching goal of ‘preserving Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity’ (CFR, 2024), and may be viewed as neglecting the direct needs of Ukraine's military.

1. Deepening the Alliance: Improving internal cooperation between Member States  

If we assume that internal consensus is essential in critical situations like the current one, NATO could alternatively focus on addressing internal challenges to generate a greater sense of unity and cohesiveness within the alliance. This policy option would entail the improvement of interoperability between Member States - especially for data exchange and weapon systems connectivity - (Garamone, 2022), focusing on training, mobility, and logistics by using PESCO projects to bring support to NATO via EU countries (Chatham House, 2023), and leading internal diplomacy to convince the US, Slovakia, Hungary, and others, to uphold their support to Ukraine.   

This policy option has the benefit of contributing to the long-term strategic stability of the Alliance and the Euro-Atlantic region. Improving interoperability could lead to better coordination and communication between Member States and ‘reduce duplications, enable the pooling of resources, and produce synergies among all Allies’ (NATO, 2023). PESCO projects could support NATO to carry out its missions more effectively, including improving its supply chains, the mobility of troops, and equipment. Upholding US support could ensure that the alliance is well-funded and resourced. Thus, the implementation of such measures can unite NATO, making it better equipped to deter any form of aggression, and in turn enhance its credibility and role as a global security provider (Brauss, 2023). Additionally, Ukraine can also indirectly benefit from a more comprehensive NATO as it can secure funds for its military and facilitate smoother joint operations, leading to faster progress on the battlefield (Adriani, 2023).

Although deepening the alliance would ultimately be extremely beneficial for NATO long-term, against the criteria of sustaining Ukraine in its immediate needs, this policy option - which focuses on reinforcing NATO as an institution - would require too much time before tangible benefits materialise, even after the recent decision of the US Congress to unblock further aid to Ukraine. Considering the current state of events, the problem at stake is not NATO as an institution but the support for the first line of conflict, Ukraine.

Policy recommendation

Excessive time has been wasted in half measures stemming from misplaced fears of Russian escalation (Giles, 2023). NATO’s best policy option is therefore the first: increase ammunition and weapon systems support to Ukraine in view of a strategic counter-attack to liberate Crimea. Reinforcing flank countries and deepening the internal cooperation between Member States would entail failing to support Ukraine immediately with weapons and ammunition which is inadmissible (Claudin, 2024). Ukraine will not be able to sustain the war effort on its own, causing it to lose and ‘set a precedent that encourages aggressors worldwide and degrades the rules-based international order’ (Chatham House, 2023). 

Essentially, NATO should:

Mitigate political stand-offs by persuading public opinion to keep supporting the war effort. The Member States’ governments leading this operation (UK, DE, FR, IT, CZ, PL) should market the investment in Ukraine as one towards their own security. They should ‘adopt public communications strategies, challenging narratives around the fiscal costs of supporting Ukraine’ (Ibid). For supplying long-range missiles, it should be made clear that these are not new costs and rather represent material already available. Moreover, the long-term contracts with production companies are not solely about sustaining the immediate war effort in Ukraine but are also necessary to replenish NATO’s own stockpiles of weapons as a preventive measure (Arnold, 2024). 

Collect 100 billion euros through government bonds to sustain the war effort for the next five years; This ‘Trump-proof’ measure is needed to ensure that enough money reaches Ukraine regardless of electoral results (The Guardian, 2024). The funds will allow the establishment of long-term contracts with European armament manufacturing companies. A complementary measure could be to shorten the time frame of European aid to Ukraine: rather than distribute aid until 2028, states should commit to giving the same amount but faster (Cerasa, 2024). NATO needs to ‘stop running away from difficult decisions’ and urgently meet its defense spending targets (CFR, 2024). 

Exert pressure on Germany to send Taurus missiles (or equivalent) to Ukraine; Owning an arsenal of 600 Taurus missiles with 150 deployable, Germany can largely afford to send 100 to Ukraine (Denisova, 2024). Unlike the US which needs to balance Pacific and European defense commitments, there are ‘no compelling arguments for Europeans to hold back weapon supplies’ (DiCianna, 2024). Other Member States have already sent long-range missiles to Ukraine - the US’s ATACMS (Dickinson, 2023), the UK’s Storm Shadow (Macaskill and James, 2023), and France’s SCALP (Irish, 2023) - thus, Germany should not be exempted from doing so as well. In case, there is a possibility for a ‘circular swap’ between Germany and the UK: Germany would send Taurus missiles to the UK, enabling the latter to send more of its Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine while maintaining control over their deployments to avoid escalations (Rothwell, 2024).

By: Greta Ricci