We often mistake the visible tip for the entire iceberg, especially when it comes to the murky world of espionage. Unbeknownst to us, the world of espionage has transformed into a new beast. The 21st century brought speed, efficiency and precision – but at what cost? Cyber warfare is flourishing, giving ill-intentioned states the ability to manipulate defense and alarm systems, to launch potentially devastating strikes even before the average man wakes up for work. Therefore, cyber warfare poses a potentially insurmountable challenge to European security, given the region’s geographical proximity to Russia. Russia, is a nation which has been dangerously intensifying its espionage operations throughout Europe, by employing not only cyber and technological warfare but also a coordinated infiltration and exploitation of European intelligence networks. 

The surge of Russian legal and illegal espionage threatens European security and further destabilizes an already fragile peace on the continent. Russian espionage in Europe is nothing new but its recent escalation is extremely concerning. Norwegian Intelligence Chief, Vice Admiral Nils Andreas Stensønes, believes that the “risk level has changed and that sabotage is more likely, (Starcevic, 2024). Prior to the establishment of the Russian Federation in 1991, the KGB, the Soviet Union's intelligence service, performed similar operations in Europe, most notably by the Cambridge 5, a group of students who were recruited by KGB during their studies at Cambridge University in the 1930s. Although espionage is multifaceted, it generally separates itself into “legal” and “illegal” spies. Legal spies operate under diplomatic cover and therefore face minimal risk of persecution as the likely course of action is being declared a persona non grata (Hernandez, 2020). In contrast, illegal spies are deeply entrenched in a country, with no protection, tasked with passing sensitive information onto their handlers. A recent example of such activities was the prisoner swap, in August 2024, of Anna Dultseva and Artem Dultsev; two Russian illegal deep cover spies who had posed as an Argentine couple living in Slovenia (Sahuquillo, 2024).

A likely factor contributing to the increase of espionage targeted at the European Union is the Russia-Ukraine war. Russia may be aiming to sabotage NATO aid flowing to Ukraine, considering the fact that NATO aid has amounted to over 100 billion dollars, in military, humanitarian and financial aid (Statista Research Department, 2024). Aid of this size undoubtedly influences the tide of the war, helping Ukraine conduct effective military operations against its Russian counterparts. A recent example exemplifying the effect of NATO aid was seen in January 2025, with the Ukrainian military launching a surprise counterattack into Russia's southern region, Kursk. The head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, recently described this as: “Kursk region, good news, Russia is getting what it deserves.” (Lister, 2025). Therefore, highlighting a potential motivation behind an increase of Russian espionage in Europe; thwarting NATOs aid which would limit the Ukrainian army's capacity to both resist Russian assaults and invade Russian territory. Russia’s attempts to achieve this can be quantified by the rise of suspicious unexplainable activities which have recently occurred in the European Union. Events including sabotage on German military bases, and bombs exploding in both DHL factories in Birmingham, England, and Leipzig, Germany. Officially, the Kremlin denies any involvement, claiming that links between the Kremlin and the factory explosions were "unsubstantiated insinuations from the media” (Cutler, 2024).

However, the EU has presented a different conclusion. It is believed that the parcels that exploded were simply “test runs” for parcels ultimately bound on planes to America and Canada (Cutler, 2024). A comment from Polish’ Chief of Foreign Intelligence Pawel Szota encapsulates the severity of this revelation: "I'm not sure the political leaders of Russia are aware of the consequences if one of these packages exploded, causing a mass casualty event" (Cutler, 2024). Had Russia’s plans succeeded this wouldn’t have directly inflicted casualties on European soil but still would have dramatically heightened tensions between the EU and Russia due to America and Canada’s longtime alliance with the EU. This act of violence clearly suggests that Russia's espionage operations have dangerously radicalized, particularly considering that only a delay caused the device to explode on the ground in Leipzig and not midflight. A statement by Germany’s Domestic Intelligence Chief Thomas Haldenwang further contextualizes its implications: “as putting people's lives at risk, affects all areas of our free society." (Cutler, 2024). Moreover, the head of MI5, Ken McCallum, disclosed that since the invasion of Ukraine over 400 undeclared Russian intelligence operatives have been expelled from the EU (Dejene, 2024). We may never know the true motivations behind the political expulsions, as they could simply be the product of rising geopolitical tensions. Nevertheless, it still signifies that espionage is increasing via both official and covert channels. Admittedly, there are significant obstacles to understanding the aims and motivations of legal spies. When illegal spies are uncovered, a free investigation can be undertaken in order to understand their objectives. In contrast, legal spies are insulated by their diplomatic status. Thus, once discovered, European officials only have one recourse: declaring them a persona non grata. This hinders both the general public and politicians from understanding the real aims and objectives of “legal” spies. Therefore, clearly underscoring the grave risk that Russian “legal” espionage operations pose to European collective security.

The Russian espionage apparatus can be envisioned as a three headed beast. The first head consists of legal spies, who are usually politicians, diplomats, or educated, politically influential individuals. A damning revelation out of Brussels provides a clear case of a legal spy. ‘The Insider’, an independent Russian newspaper, has accused Latvian MP Tatjana Zdanoka of “spreading propaganda about alleged violations of the rights of Russians living in Baltic countries and arguing for a pro-Kremlin policy, among other things” (Associated Press, 2024). Zdanoka is now under investigation not only by a subsection of the European Commission, the Advisory Committee on the Code of Conduct, for having worked for Russian intelligence services since 2004 but also by the Lativian Security Service as of April 2024 (Fornusek, 2024). Suspicion is reaffirmed by the fact she was also one of the 13 people who voted against the condemnation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in March 2022 (Gramer, 2024). Moreover, the Kremlin not only entices foreign nationals to spy on its behalf but also sends their own FSB agents, posing as politicians, deep into the heart of Brussels. This is supported by a parliamentary question written by Lithuanian politician Petras Auštrevičius, E-003607/2023, revealing that the Belgian State Security Service identified Kirill Logvinov, a chief diplomat at Russia’s permanent mission to the EU, as a potential Russian spy. Further exemplifying the intricate nature of Russian espionage within the highest echelons of power in Europe. 

Its second head are illegal spies. This is the most dangerous avenue of espionage for operatives, as one operates alone or in close knit circles without diplomatic cover. Examples include the recent attempted sabotage on a US Grafenwöhr in Bavaria, Germany. This resulted in the arrest of three men, Dieter S and two other Russian-German nationals. Prosecutors uncovered a plot to commit explosive and arson attacks in Germany (Deutsche Welle, 2024). These attacks would have targeted a strategic location in which Ukrainian troops are trained to operate American tanks. This is supported by a statement of the Federal Public Prosecutor General Jens Rommel condemning Dieter S, the primary suspect “as sufficiently suspected of having been a member of a terrorist organization abroad (Section 129a (1) no. 1 StGB, Section 129b (1) sentences 1 and 2 StGB). He is also accused of preparing a serious act of violence endangering the state (Section 89a para. 2 no. 2, para. 3 StGB).” (Rommel, 2024). Another example of this is when Igor K. and Maximilian K. were arrested for attacking Leonid Volkov (Reuters, 2024). Volkov was a close ally of the recently deceased Alexei Navalny, a Russian political activist who openly opposed Vladimir Putin. The police report outlined Volkov was attacked with a hammer and pepper spray outside his home in Vilnius, Lithuania. (Anders, 2024). A plenitude of violent crimes and treasonous terror plots exemplify a broader trend towards increased pro-Russian espionage and crime throughout Europe. Overall, serving to not only highlight Russia’s extensive influence within Europe but also indicates a lack of safety for political migrants seeking refuge in the EU, who can still be reached by the Kremlin.

The final head to be dissected is cyber crime. Crimes of this nature go beyond sabotaging military targets and aim to undermine the European democratic order as we know it. For instance APT 28, a pro Russian hacker group linked to the Kremlin, was identified as “responsible for attacking SPD party, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, headquarters and other targets including defence, IT and aerospace companies” in January 2023 (Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, 2024). Moreover, Romania’s recent election has become a prime example of both Russia's increased interference within European affairs and the rising use of espionage to strike at democratic processes. Călin Georgescu, a far right nationalist with suspected ties to the Kremlin, was poised to win the first round of the election. However, on December 6th, the results were annulled by the Romanian constitutional court following the declassification of documents by Romanian intelligence services. These documents outlined voter manipulation via social media platforms, financing on TikTok, and cyber attacks orchestrated by foreign governments (Ghement, 2024). US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has drawn parallels between this event and recent complications in elections in Georgia and Moldova, both suspected of foreign involvement. This highlights how the Kremlin continuously attempts to manipulate and undermine European security.

Nevertheless, European intelligence services are well aware of Russia’s end goal; to undermine democratic institutions and distort the fundamental values that make the European Union and NATO the most prosperous alliance in human history. As such, European intelligence services have been effectively working together to combat this. An example of this is a new form of hybrid sanctions imposed upon 16 individuals and three entities sanctioned on the 16th December 2024 for being: “responsible for Russia’s destabilising actions abroad” (Martin, 2024). The individuals under sanction have varying accusations from spreading Russian propaganda around Europe and Africa to, most notably, undertaking a classified intelligence operation against the BND, the German Foreign Intelligence Service, in which intelligence documents were leaked to Russia's equivalent, the FSB. The protagonist in this case, Vladimir Sergiyenko, was a political strategist working alongside Eugen Schmidt, a far right german politician, the AFD. Sergiyenko is accused of directly working with Colonel Ilya Vechtomov, an FSB agent, in which his moves were orchestrated and funded by the Kremlin (Lehberger, 2024). This case not only highlights the intricacies of combating espionage, as often suspected collaborators to the Kremlin like Sergiyenko are deeply embedded within European politics, but also the effective steps taken by Europe’s intelligence services in order to ostracize and remove spies from the highest echelons of power within the EU. 

In conclusion, recent Russian espionage operations throughout Europe have showcased how the world of espionage already has undergone dramatic change. It is a three headed beast with no intention of stopping. Therefore, it is imperative that the young generation is aware of Russian sabotages, as currently seemingly minor, its cumulative effects could be catastrophic. Moreover, there needs to be a greater emphasis on developing newer and more efficient defense systems to safeguard the EU. This includes restructuring intelligence services and increasing education and awareness. Properly informing a new generation of thinkers to take politically conscious decisions not only serves the best interests of the modern day, but ensures lasting collective security on European soil.