Sudan's conflict recently dominated the news for satellite images proving large-scale civilian massacres. As the civil war enters its third year, the humanitarian catastrophe is deepening. Over 100,000 people have died, while 12 million have fled their homes (Booty & Chothia, 2025). More than 24 million Sudanese face acute food insecurity.

Behind every strike lies a question often overlooked: Who is paying for all of this? The weapons fueling the conflict flow through deep networks of shell companies, international banks, and resource extraction schemes. At the heart of the RSF's financial empire sits GSK Advance. Officially, the company deals with information technology and computer service activities, but in reality, it functions as a front for RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and his family. The company’s servers host website domains of at least twelve other RSF-affiliated companies, representing a corporate constellation that hides the ultimate beneficiary while operating across multiple sectors (Lynch, 2023). GSK is allegedly run by two of Hemedti’s brothers and is thought to be a front company for the RSF. GSK Advance's most significant role was its connection to Alkhaleej Bank, Sudan's second-largest bank. According to C4ADS, an American think tank, Hemedti's network owned at least 28.35% of Alkhaleej’s shares, but further analyses estimated that it may reach up to 58.28%, potentially giving the RSF leader controlling power in a major national financial institution (Lynch, 2023).

The bank drained resources from Sudan's civilian economy and converted them into military capabilities, representing an economic architecture designed to extract wealth and use it to purchase weaponry. However, when the U.S. Treasury sanctioned GSK Advance in September 2023, they were targeting just one node in a network of over 400 state and security service-owned enterprises that both the RSF and Sudanese Armed Forces use to gain economic power (Lynch, 2023). Foreign actors are drawn to where precious resources lie; while banks provided a financial infrastructure, gold has supplied much of the actual wealth. Hemedti built his fortune controlling Sudan's gold mines, and the illicit export of gold has also become a major source of funding for the war. Egypt is now buying gold in zones controlled by the Sudanese army, while the United Arab Emirates has become a destination for gold mined in RSF-controlled areas, as it is allegedly providing weapons to the RSF (Booty & Chothia, 2025). Finally, Russia’s paramilitary company is also facilitating large purchases of RSF-controlled gold and providing them with air missiles (Abascal, 2025).

Additionally, Foreign Affairs highlighted that at the beginning of the current conflict, the SAF had significantly higher military capacity; it is evident that the war would not have lasted this long if it was not for the RSF’s illicit financing networks alongside the UAE’s military and financial support (De Waal, 2024). Diplomatic efforts remain insufficient, as a result of a reluctance that may be explained by the UAE’s role. Other than having high interests in the conflict, Abu Dhabi is also the largest foreign direct investor in Washington. Until the international community matches its humanitarian rhetoric with serious financial pressure, hindering the economic infrastructure that allows the perpetuation of the war rather than sanctioning a few entities, conflict will remain a profitable business.