An Assessment of the Propensity for a Present-Day Equatoguinean Civil War

By: Dominic Boucher

Equatorial Guinea has faced a number of difficulties since its inception as a state. Since gaining independence from Spain in 1968, the small Central African nation has suffered under the regimes of only two dictators. Its current leader, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, is notorious for his autocracy and continued human rights abuses. This essay uses the Collier-Hoeffler model to assess the risk of civil war in Equatorial Guinea. This framework is based on Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s paper ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’ (2000), with additional insights from their work, ‘On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa’ (2002). Collier and Hoeffler divide civil wars into two categories. They outline ‘greed’ civil wars as having the incentive to take up arms is based on the economic potential to control natural resource exports and wealth of a country. They also note that some civil wars are driven by ‘grievance,’ with a rebellion promising a public good due to an existing regime’s failures in service to a population. It finds that ‘greed’ forms of civil war are much more likely than ‘grievance’ forms of the model, but one driven by a combination of both factors is the mostly likely to occur. It also presents country-dependent risk factors for both forms of civil war, which this essay will use to aid analysis. This review finds that, in line with Collier and Hoeffler’s predictions, Equatorial Guinea at risk of all forms of civil war. It is especially vulnerable to conflicts fitting the ‘greed’ model, spurred on by high economic dependence on oil. Ethnic fractionalisation and discrimination, as well as wealth inequality and limited political freedoms can compound with the ‘greed’ model or provide an alternatively high-risk ‘grievance’ basis for insurrection. These risks are likely to increase in the near future with the potential for a succession crisis when Obiang dies. Only certain characteristics of the country favour Equatorial Guinea in avoiding civil war. These are primarily the distance between the mainland and Bioko and low diaspora engagement, or the politically motivated tendency of diaspora populations to send financial support to a potential participant in a civil war. 

The Collier-Hoeffler model predicts Equatorial Guinea to have close to the maximum risk for a ‘greed’ type of civil war, with a high incentive to take up arms based on the potential to control natural resource exports and wealth of a country (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000). Naturally, a high percentage of natural resource rents as a share of GDP will increase this incentive, and the Collier-Hoeffler (2002) model considers the percentage most vulnerable to civil war to be 26%. Equatorial Guinea’s percentage is 27% (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2023), indicating a very high risk for civil war according to the ‘greed’ model. 89.9% of these exports are energy commodities, especially oil and natural gas, which require very limited citizen involvement for extraction and lead to high income inequality. The rents obtained from these resources are concentrated in the hands of the Equatoguinean elite, funding their lavish lifestyles. As such, there are high incentives for a rebel group to initiate a civil war to displace Obiang and obtain these incomes for themselves, given the large financial rewards. 

The geography of Equatorial Guinea may limit the potential for rebellion somewhat. The Equatoguinean military’s capacity to quash a rebellion is enhanced by having high population densities, and as such, a high military capacity present near the main areas of oil and gas extraction, being the capital of Malabo on Bioko Island and the mainland port city of Bata (AFEX Global, 2014), (CIA, 2024). A successful rebellion would have to take these key locations for control, and traversal between the mainland and Bioko Island is militarily challenging. As such, these logistical challenges provide disincentives to rebel groups looking to gain control of the whole country, but there may be the possibility for a greed-based separatist movement to occur in Bioko or the mainland. This is not accounted for explicitly in the Collier-Hoeffler model, and is a possibility created by Equatorial Guinea’s unique natural resource endowments, and population distribution within its geography. Additionally, this geography suggests a more likely coup d’etat situation, which has already been attempted three times and succeeded once, in which Obiang deposed his uncle of the presidency. Taking direct control of the military and only having to depose the president and any loyalists in this way would bypass the geographical hurdles of a full civil war. 

The chance of a ‘grievance’ civil war be considered less likely that the ‘greed’ form, but still very high-risk. One way that Collier and Hoeffler (2000) highlight as a contributory factor to ‘grievance’ civil wars is ethnoreligious fractionalisation. Religious fractionalisation is unlikely to be a source of conflict, as the US Department of State (2016) analyses the situation of religious freedoms and equality to be relatively positive in Equatorial Guinea. However, ethnic conflict is more likely to cause civil war. Equatorial Guinea’s dominant ethnic group, the Fang, situated largely on the mainland, comprises 78.1% of the country’s population, while the Bubi people, native to Bioko, are 9.4% of the population (CIA, 2024). As such, bucking the trend for Africa (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002), Equatorial Guinea’s ethnic fractionalisation is a source of instability in the country, as it lands in the range that Collier and Hoeffler (2000) deem to double the risk of civil war in a country. Discrimination of the Bubi people by the Fang government has caused limitations to their economic and political opportunities for advancement (Minority Rights Group, 2023), providing motivation for an uprising. Their majority population near the capital of Malabo makes an insurrection simpler to organise and requires little logistical capability for transport. Bioko’s mountainous terrain also allows for guerrilla warfare, with traversal difficulties for the more centralised military alongside an easy availability of hiding spots. Both of these factors could provide them with the means to carry out an insurrection against the ruling government, alongside their grievances of ethnic discrimination.  

Socioeconomic and political inequality, as seen in Equatorial Guinea, is a key contributory factor for civil war in the ‘grievance’ model (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000). The extent of Equatorial Guinea’s political freedoms is dire, being the 12th least democratic country in the world according to The Economist Intelligence Unit (2023). A lack of freedom leads people to seek a change of government, even if violent, to improve their situation. The same can be said for economic inequality. Equatorial Guinea has a GINI coefficient of 50.2, making it one of the most economically unequal countries in the world (United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2023). This extreme inequality means people are more likely to turn to violent means to change their government, resulting in civil war. This could be independent of ethnic tensions or compound with them. If an insurrection unrelated to ethnic disputes began on the mainland, rebels would have several unique advantages. One of these is potential mercenary support from neighbouring countries, as seen in the 2017 coup attempt (Corey-Boulet, 2018). High forest cover and reduced military presence in the hinterlands of the country would also be useful to a rebel group in this scenario (CIA, 2024). However, they would remain limited in reaching Bioko as mentioned previously. This presents the alternative potential of a mainland separatist movement rather than a conventional civil war.  

Diaspora engagement is a factor noted by Collier and Hoeffler (2000) also as a facilitating factor for civil war. With a politically engaged diaspora wealthy and willing enough to send resources to support a cause in their country of origin, a ‘grievance’ civil war becomes more likely. In the case of Equatorial Guinea, remittances make up 0.59% of GDP, and most of the diaspora population is in lower income African countries, especially Gabon. However, a notable diaspora population of over twenty thousand exists in Spain, and it is politically polarised and engaged (European Union Global Diaspora Facility, 2020). Significant human rights abuses or media reports on atrocities or economic inequalities could spark a civil war through this mechanism. However, given the limited existing flows of money to Equatorial Guinea, limited diaspora engagement policies on the part of the government and heavy controls on press freedom, the diaspora population is unlikely to be a significant factor in an Equatoguinean civil war.  

The succession of Obiang is unaccounted for in the model, and upon his death, some groups or individuals may look to take advantage of the instability, risking civil war. Obiang is 82 years old, and upon his death, his son, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, is expected to become the country’s next leader. De jure mechanisms for the transfer of power via elections are outlined in the constitution (Equatorial Guinea, 2012). However, they are heavily rigged and manipulated in favour of the ruling Obiang. Since independence, no precedent exists for the transfer of presidential power, with the only transition of power having been the coup that led to Obiang taking charge. As such, parties motivated by both ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ could see an ad hoc succession process after Obiang’s death as an opportunity to revolt and take control of the country. Obiang has reportedly been planning for this as early as 2006, when he asked the Angolan military to be prepared to send troops to his country if needs be to support his son’s bid for power upon his death (Afrol News, 2020). It is unlikely that this particular agreement holds up today given the time passed as well as the Angolan president at the time’s death in 2017, but there is likely to be some internal plan for securing Obiang’s successor. 

Another shift which makes the risk of civil war more subject to change is the construction of a new capital city, to be called Djibloho, on the mainland of the country. Construction began in 2011, but the government as of now has only partially moved to the city (BBC News, 2017). This would significantly alter the geographic and military control dynamics of the country. An insurgency exclusive to Bioko would become less risky given a reduced military presence on the island without the capital. It would also present less reward, with a lower likelihood of controlling the whole country as central government functions in the mainland would remain inaccessible. It would also reduce the risk of a mainland insurgency. At present, the hilly, forested terrain further into the mainland advantageous to rebel group operations in an asynchronous warfare situation would provide cover against a more organised military which would suffer from hindered traversal abilities. The shift in the capital’s location would mean a stronger military node of command near them to better control this threat. However, the presidential and military move from Malabo to Djibloho has not yet occurred. This will be the key factor in shifting the existing geographical control dynamic, and it is unclear as to when this move will take place.  

Overall, Equatorial Guinea indeed suffers from a high risk of civil war, with a higher risk of one conforming to the ‘greed’ model, but a high chance nonetheless of a ‘grievance’ civil war. In addition, there is nothing preventing factors contributing to both from compounding and creating a civil war with hybrid motivations. Economic factors, especially the fact that high natural resource rents of a percentage of GDP are concentrated in the hands of a privileged few, create huge incentives to take control of this wealth through a ‘greed’ type of civil war. Sociopolitical factors such as inequality, restrictions on political freedoms and ethnic fractionalisation and discrimination create a high risk of a ‘grievance’ type of civil war. Geographical factors may help or hinder an insurgency depending on the location or nature of the insurgency, with a Bioko-focused civil war having a higher risk and lower reward, with the opposite true for one limited to the mainland. This dynamic, unaccounted for by the Collier-Hoeffler model and unique to Equatorial Guinea, will reverse with the planned movement of the capital to the mainland. Also unaccounted for in the model is the succession of Obiang, which creates imminent risk of instability ripe to be exploited by rebel groups with the aging president’s lack of a clear succession plan. All this considered, Equatorial Guinea should aim to instate measures for socioeconomic equality, economic diversification, and end ethnic persecution and sham elections to avoid a fate of civil war.