Proxy Wars in the Middle East: Regional Powers and their Impact Worldwide

By: Daghan Jacob Gonulluoglu

Throughout history, the Middle East has continuously been set as one of the main battlegrounds within the geopolitical sphere, both literally and figuratively. Proxy wars, driven by local entities and foreign interests, dominate modern conflicts in West Asia as global powers use the region to assert their influence. The involvement of the main local actors such as the likes of Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel, coupled with other players such as the United States, China and Russia, has turned local quarrels into very large worldwide disputes garnering the attention of the entire international community. In order for one to understand the dynamics of contemporary international relations, it is crucial to examine the inner-workings of proxy wars and their global implications. This article will therefore explain proxy wars in the Middle East by first providing some context behind how proxy wars first developed in the region, then delving into the role of local actors and their strategies before examining how the external actors are involved within such conflicts, and finally finishing with the multiple ways in which proxy wars in West Asia impact the globe and set any potential pathways for solving conflicts of this nature in the future. 

First of all, it is important to note that the concept of proxy wars in the Middle East is not exclusively a modern phenomenon. In fact, proxy wars in the region can be traced back to the Cold War period, as both the United States and the Soviet Union greatly influenced the region ideologically, with the Soviet Union championing communism all the while the United States pushed back with their liberal ideals, and it is originally this ideological rift between different state and non-state actors that allowed for this period of influence to take place. A great lack of powerful political figures, as well as a lack of solidarity between states  in the Middle East for each other, made it easy for global superpowers to capitalize on this insecurity in order to come in and disrupt the area (Farhadinasab and Jafari, 2016). The Cold War was known to be a period of great competition between the Americans and the Soviets, and this competition would spill into their policy towards approaching the Middle East. Each side aimed to exert their power and influence over each other by not directly intervening militarily, which they knew would risk a potential nuclear conflict between them, dooming them both. They intervened in conflicts all over the globe in places like Afghanistan, Angola, Korea and Vietnam in order to further their ideological interests (Farhadinasab and Jafari, 2016). In the Middle East, both the Soviets and Americans supported their mediators in the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) from a financial, military (providing weapons among other ways of aid) and organisational perspective. The Cold War would act as the precursor to a host of other proxy wars in the region particularly after the Arab Spring, with conflicts such as the Syrian Civil war that started in 2011 but has seemingly come to an abrupt end in late 2024 (Tellidou, 2024), among other conflicts in Libya and Yemen. This is due to the fact that the proxy wars in the Cold War left the region full of fragmented states with a legacy of sectarianism and pervasive external influence, making West Asia even more prone to the international interference in the area that continues to this day. 

 As previously mentioned, the Middle East is home to a number of powerful states on a regional level, and each one of these actors’ strategies involves working with different proxies in the area by aiding them on several fronts, as well as external powers in order to further their political and territorial agendas, while also putting themselves in a position for further collaboration with the same global powers. Four countries in the Middle East meet the standard to be considered  “regional powers”, namely Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel, due to each country's capacity to have a genuine impact on regional and global power politics, through either their military and financial advantages, strategic location, and geopolitical reach, which are all things their smaller Middle Eastern counterparts either lack or had previously in  a time in history but failed to maintain (Ehteshami, 2014). Iran, being the most powerful state of Shia majority, has proclaimed itself as the protector of Shias across West Asia. This can be seen through their support of Shia militias in the area, with the likes of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen among other groups in Iraq and Syria, who receive considerable military aid and training by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the main branch of the Iranian Armed Forces (Kanber, 2024). Iran's main objectives in the region include using its proxies in order to become more influential in Sunni-dominated areas (known as Shia crescent Strategy) and curb Israeli influence in the area, with Iran considering Israel to be its primary regional enemy, which was made even more apparent with Iran's actions towards Israel in the current Israel-Hamas war with the Iranian regime expressing its staunch support for Hezbollah and Hamas fighters. 

Moreover, Saudi Arabia, widely considered to be Iran's Sunni counterpart, views itself as the beacon for Sunni Muslims across the Middle East but also the rest of the world, due to its geographic location and its role within Islamic history. Unlike Iran, Saudi Arabia has partnerships with Western powers such as the United States, as well as prominent military and economic ties with other countries in the Gulf via the Gulf Cooperation Council, most notably the United Arab Emirates (Kanber, 2024). These alliances are part of Saudi Arabia's strategy to counter Iran's Shia influence, as they collaborate militarily with the UAE and have the capacity to purchase state-of-the-art weaponry from Europe and the United States with them being the region's largest economy with a GDP of $1.068 trillion for which 10% contributes to its annual defence budget (Ehteshami, 2014). Saudi Arabia has been known to use its military and financial prowess to back anti-Houthi forces in the Yemeni civil war and Sunni-rebel groups in Syria, showcasing their involvement in the complex proxy war landscape of the Middle East. 

With regards to Turkey, their strategy heavily leans on using proxies in order to exert their influence in their former Ottoman territories under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This can actually be considered a shift in policy by the Turkish state in recent times, as they gradually moved away from trying to integrate themselves into the European political landscape with their bid to join the European Union seemingly proving to be unsuccessful, with the Turks having been met with hostility from a number of member states such as the likes of France and Greece (Ehteshami, 2014). Turkey has also been involved in Libya and Syria in the context of the Syrian Civil War. Its objectives include conserving its territorial integrity, addressing the ongoing refugee crisis as well as countering any terrorist threats coming from Kurdish militia groups (Kanber, 2024). Most recently, Turkish forces openly backed the Syrian HTS coalition of insurgent groups that toppled the Assad regime, consequently bringing a new order of political leadership into the country, which highlights once again Turkey's involvement in different territorial conflicts in order to bolster its own position in the region and further its interests. 

When it comes to Israel, they possess a very different background to the rest of the Middle East, due to the way in which the state is composed, with it being a self-characterized Jewish state, setting it apart from its Shia and Sunni counterparts in the region. The country has faced high levels of hostility ever since its creation, due to its neighbours considering it to be a “planted” state because of the way in which the state came into fruition through Western interference, and questioning its legitimacy (Ehteshami, 2014). Through its strong relationships with Western powers, especially the United States which is the state’s main contributor to its military arsenal, Israel has been allowed to evolve into a genuine force to be reckoned with in the region, especially due to the fact that it is the only country in the area to have possession of nuclear weaponry (Ehteshami, 2014). Its main objectives involve countering Iranian influence in the region and securing its borders. Due to the country's strained relationship with its neighbours, this has started to become increasingly difficult, especially with the likes of Iran vying to develop their own nuclear programme and groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah continuing to be a serious threat to state sovereignty due to Israel's long-standing issues with the Palestinians. 

On the other hand, while the main regional powers are operating within the Middle East and pursuing their respective military and territorial objectives with the help of their proxies, there are several global powers from the outside looking in, vying for influence in the much contested area through their own strategic involvement in West Asian conflicts. The first, and undoubtedly the biggest player in Middle Eastern proxy wars in terms of their ability to project their influence, is the United States. It is no secret that the United States possesses a host of military bases in the Middle East, with the U.S Central Command also being deployed in Iraq and Syria (Mueller, Wasser, Martini and Watts, 2017) which plays heavily into their ability to influence proxies in the region. As mentioned before, the United States has formed deep partnerships with some regional actors in the region such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, for which they help with training their soldiers, advising their operations, and by exporting weapons to them (U.S. Department of Defence and CENTCOM). The United States has also been known to work with Kurdish groups for counterterrorism purposes against Al-Qaeda. The Americans therefore essentially use certain regional powers and groups in order to suppress Iranian influence, secure energy flows, and fight terrorism (Mueller, Wasser, Martini and Watts, 2017).

Another global power that has been heavily involved in the Middle East is Russia, whose main objective has been to minimize American influence in the region as much as possible, starting all the way back in the Cold War days. Moscow's greatest involvement could be said to have been in the Syrian Civil War, with the Russians support for the Bashar al-Assad regime, and their involvement in training the Syrian Armed Forces, which allowed them to establish naval bases along the Eastern Mediterranean and protect the natural resources in the country (Thomas, 2020). The potential destruction of the Assad regime was always seen as problematic for the Russians, as they would lose a strong ally that had a great foothold in the region, and helped them counter any potential terrorist threats that could reach Russian borders, as radical anti-government Russian and Central Asian extremists have known to fight alongside Syrian rebels (Thomas, 2020). Russian private military and security contractors (PMSCs) are also very involved in proxy wars in the Middle East. The Putin government denies any connection to Russian PMSCs such as the Wagner group, but casualties in places where the Kremlin is heavily involved such as Syria and Libya delegitimize such claims (Rondeux, 2019).

Lastly, while not directly involved very militarily in the region, nor possessing any sort of proxies within any conflicts within it, China is still a very important player when it comes to the Middle East, and therefore worth mentioning beside both the United States and Russia. Beijing possesses very similar objectives to its global power counterparts, with them seeing the region as very economically promising, with a great focus on energy security. China has already made great strides in its economic goals in the Middle East with the development of their new Silk Road initiative which could potentially signal for more involvement in the future. What sets the Chinese apart from the Americans and the Russians is the fact that their diplomatic relations with states in the Middle East, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia, are mostly strong, which allows them to act as mediators between states for their own interest as it solidifies its connections with all parties, and even build greater engagement with countries that they do not traditionally cooperate with such as the United States (Scobell and Nader, 2016). 

With so many different actors with their own personal agendas concentrated in the Middle East, there are bound to be several consequences that proxy wars have had on the region itself due to the unstable environment that the presence of these varied actors have created. These impacts include humanitarian crises, such as the displacement and death of civilian populations due to continued conflict, terrorism and radicalization of civilians, economic problems, geopolitical instability, and the refugee crisis. The Syrian Civil War alone, resulted in several hundreds of thousand of deaths and the displacement of another 14 million per the OHCHR and the SOHR between 2011 and 2022. The war in Yemen also led to widespread famine and disease due to years of ongoing conflict. The Middle East is one of the world's premier oil and gas suppliers, which means when the Middle Eastern energy sector is affected by proxy wars, it has ripple effects on the rest of the planet. Moreover, as discussed previously, proxy wars have made the Middle East into a hotbed of division between global and regional powers, which have the potential to make its way into the international political arena and fuel further tension between states such as Russia and the USA. Finally, the displacement of civilians in war-torn Middle Eastern countries has fueled the refugee crisis, with swaths of civilians making their way to Western countries and particularly the Occident. This has not only greatly affected the refugees, but also the civilians who are living in these countries, with many attributing the rise of far-right parties in Western Europe such as the AfD in Germany and the Front National in France to the poorly managed influx of refugees. Refugees have often been blamed for a rise in crime across Western host countries, with far-right populists pointing to the large incarceration rates of people with ethnic backgrounds, as well as a lack of jobs and resources for “natives”, which has continued to drive tensions between immigrants and Western-born citizens. 

It is apparent that these consequences need addressing, and that there needs to be a concentrated effort to ending proxy wars in the Middle East in the near future. Many solutions have been brought forward by the international community and political scientists worldwide, such as the need for major investments in development in the region and diplomacy between global and regional powers, rather than simply vying to push for selfish state-centric strategic goals every time (Stark, 2020). In the international political arena, the United States would do well to establish an independent third-party investigator that keeps states accountable and prevents conflicts of interest between them (Benowitz and Ceccanese, 2020). The global powers must present themselves as mediators and focus on building relationships between regional rivals such as the likes of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Economic development can also address the causes for radicalization and the need to take up arms due to civilian discontent, since it could help hinder the effects of poverty and unemployment. 

In conclusion, proxy wars in the Middle East are the end result of the interaction of regional rivalries, and global aspirations and grievances that have long been embedded amongst the people of West Asia throughout history. As mentioned, the actions of regional actors (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel) who have their own distinct aspirations and strategies, closely intertwine with those of the global powers (USA, Russia, and China). The interactions between these countries has led to widespread divisions in the region while simultaneously fueling humanitarian crises (refugee crisis), political and economic instability (radicalization of populations) and geopolitical tensions on a global scale. In order for proxy wars to end in the near future, it would require for states to see beyond their own personal interests  and consistently work together to mitigate its causes and impacts on the region which can only be achieved through the prioritization of development and cooperation, and the significant reduction of foreign interference. The importance of ending such conflicts are not only crucial for the Middle East but the entire world, as their impact shapes global security, foreign relations, economic stability and human rights for generations to come. 

Syria’s Long Road to Victory: How Assad’s Regime Survived a 13-Year Uprising

By: Lina Ayaichia

From the streets of Aleppo, Hama, to Damascus, all the way to London and Istanbul; Syrians across the world are gathered to celebrate the end of the nearly three-decade-long authoritarian and repressive regime of Bashar Al-Assad. Marking the end of the Alawite Ba’athist regime that has ruled Syria since 1970 and a new beginning for the people of Syria.

Bashar Al-Assad, predecessor of his father Hafez Al-Assad, came into power in the year 2000, replacing his father as president after his death. The Assad regime was an Alawite Ba’athist government; Alawites were favoured in the socio-political sphere, being placed in prestigious roles such as the military to ministers and the intelligence services (F.C Hof et al, 2013; p14). Disregarding the fellow ethnic and religious groups of the country, specifically the Syrian Sunni Arabs, comprising 64% of Syria’s population (N. Quilliam, 2023, F.C Hof et al, 2013; p14, C. Phillips, 2015; p357, D. Byman, 2014; p82, M.Z Jasser, 2014; p62). Under the rule of Assad’s Ba’ath party, Sunni Arabs’ religious freedoms have become limited, and were additionally restricted from political engagement, prioritising the Alawites placing them in key governmental roles, alongside other minorities, such as Druze and Christians, being 20% of military personnel, for example. Bashar al-Assad’s power was unlimited as he has weakened key institutional bodies and imprisoned those outwardly opposed his leadership, manipulating the “state of emergency” law – detaining prisoners without trial, for an unlimited time, with the use of both psychological as well as physical torture, and his government, was authoritarian and more brutal than his late father, provoking sentiments of anger, particularly among Sunni Syrians, only intensified over time (B. Zeno, 2022; pp1044, N. Quilliam, 2023, C. Phillips, 2022; p368-369).

However, the spark that has ignited the Syrian uprising of March 2011 was after the arrests and beating of Syrian children between the ages from 10 to 15, after writing an anti-government slogan stating: “the people want to overthrow the regime” in the city of Daraa. The brutal treatment of those young boys has sparked a wave of civil mobilisation across the Syrian enclave, demanding for the removal the state of emergency law, as well as implementing electoral reforms, and for the release of the political prisoners detained (S. Ismail, 2011; p539, C. Phillips, 2015; p359). The regime’s violent response to peaceful protests only fuelled the anger of the people, and what started as a call for reforms would eventually spiral into a full-blown civil war that would devastate the country for years to come. Assad, whose legitimate rule was at risk of being dissolved, took brutal measures as a means to remain in power and preserve the Ba’athist legacy of Syria – carefully calculating his scheme to diffuse the rebellion; one of them being the instrumentalization of sectarianism.

Syria is an ethnically and religiously diverse nation with a population of Arabs, Kurds, Druze with diverse religious practices of Sunni Islam, Christianity as well as Alawite. Bashar al-Assad, recognizing the potential threat posed by a unified opposition, strategically manipulated these divisions to maintain his power, by centralising the deeply complex sectarian and ethnic landscape of the country. He stoked fears among Syria’s minority communities—particularly the Druze, Christians, and Alawites—portraying the revolution as an existential threat to their safety and instilling the fear of a return of the Muslim Brotherhood that toom surge in Syria from 1976 to 82, as means of counterinsurgency against the Syrian rebels. One way Assad strategically instrumentalised the sectarianisation of Syria was to deploy his loyal Shahiba members to vandalise Alawite dominated neighbourhoods, and to frame these acts of arson onto the Sunni rebels, labelling them as Jihadist terrorists, financially funded as well as armed by Turkey, the US and Saudi Arabia in one of his speeches at the start of the Syrian uprising (C. Phillips, 2015; p369, F. Merz, 2014; p35). The criminalisation of the Syria’s Sunni rebels therefore increased feelings of insurgency amongst ethnic, religious minorities, to which Assad has perfectly calculated to draw the minorities of the country to support his leadership (C. Phillips, 2015; p369, R. Hinnebusch, 2016; p5, R. Hinnebusch, 2019; p55, B. Berti et al, 2014; p25). Fuelling and exploiting these fears to his advantage, Assad successfully garnered the support of these groups, creating a sectarian divide that complicated the opposition’s efforts to unite and gain ground; and succeeded in clearing any counterinsurgents of opposition – therefore, achieved in remaining as president for the next 13 consecutive years.

In a war marked by unimaginable suffering, Bashar al-Assad’s regime not only manipulated Syria’s deep sectarian divisions but also unleashed a campaign of violence that left an indelible mark on the Syrian people. The regime employed tactics of cruelty and repression that shocked the world, consisting of extrajudicial killings, sectarian killings, as well as sexual violence towards Sunni women committed by Assad’s Shahibas and, most horrifyingly, the use of chemical weapons against innocent civilians (C. Phillips, 2015; p360, M.Z Jasser, 2014; p62). One of the biggest, more violent chemical attacks happened in the city of Ghouta, killing an estimate of 734 Syrian fathers, mothers, siblings, and children in the neighbourhood of Zamalka alone in Eastern Ghouta (Human Rights Watch, 2013). However, this is unfortunately not an isolated case, Assad has inflicted over 216 chemical attacks on his people – demonstrating the extreme lengths Assad has taken to dissent protests against his Ba’ath party (Syrian Network for Human Rights, 2018).

Alongside chemical attacks, arbitrary arrests and brutal torture from inside Syrian prisons were additionally another form of repression and form of maintenance of the Assad regime. discovered by the Syrian rebels to release the detainees – announcing the end of the Assad regime and giving them back their freedom stolen from them once thrown into these cells, suffering from solitary confinement to physical and sexual torture inflicted from the prison guards. From recent findings, some cells were described as “coffins” – where prisoners were placed in there to either die in solitary or be tortured for an indeterminate duration of time. Within the walls of these prisons, a number of mass executions occurred, in 2017, a United Nations commission of inquiry found credible evidence that the Assad regime had carried out mass executions at Saydnaya prison, describing it as a “human slaughterhouse.” It was reported that as many as 13,000 prisoners were executed between 2011 and 2015, most of them political detainees (Amnesty International, 2017, Amnesty International, 2017; pp5-7, United Nations, 2024). These acts of merciless killings were not just calculated moves to maintain power. The images of suffering, the cries for justice, and the resilience of the Syrian people serve as a haunting testament to the cruelty of a government that saw its people as expendable in the pursuit of its own survival. Tearing apart families and communities with no remorse – and leading to the one of the biggest refugee crises in our contemporary global history. Since the beginning of this war, over 14 million Syrians had to leave their homes behind to escape Assad’s violence, and find safety for their families, with no assurance of possibly returning to their homeland (UNHCR, 2024).

As the hope that once united Syrians and people around the world to witness the end of Assad’s rule seemed to crumble, the month of December 2024 has sparked a renewed glimmer of hope for the Syrian people, reigniting a long-dormant flame of resilience and determination. With over a year of strategizing how to siege the Syrian cities from Southern Syria – the Syrian rebellion movement led by former Islamist militia, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), took siege of one large city to the next in a span of a week. Beginning with Aleppo, to Hama, to successfully pushing out Assad’s army from Daraa; to finally reaching to Damascus – pushing Bashar Al-Assad into exile in Russia on the 8th December, marking the end of the Assad rule permanently (Al Jazeera, 2024).

After 13 years of suffering, mass displacement, a river of bloodshed of Assad, backed by regional and global superpowers like Russia alongside Iran; the Ba’ath regime has come to its end. Bashar Al-Assad’s time as president of Syria will be remembered as one of the most vicious and bloodthirsty regimes of our century. With over 620 000 deaths recorded since the start of the 2011 uprising (A. Baker, 2024), and now still in count with the discovery of mass graves in the prisons; with 14 million Syrians refugees – and thousands of prisoners released from Syria’s slaughterhouses; Syria is finally given the chance to rebuild the country they envision to have.

The future remains uncertain, especially with the end of Assad’s rule, which raises many unresolved questions. What will the new Syrian government look like? What kind of governmental structures will emerge, who will be next to lead the country, will it be a one-party system under HTS? Additionally, there is the Kurdish question. The Kurds have made significant strides toward establishing an independent, secular democracy in Rojava since 2012, will their autonomy maintain, or will they begin cooperation with HTS? There is a hopeful future for the nation of Syria, the end of this long-standing dictatorship marks the dawn of a new era. Since Assad’s downfall, it has been recorded that 115 000 Syrian refugees have returned to their homeland by January 2025 (United Nations, 2025), after having to flee from the violence inflicted by the Ba’athist regime; Assad’s rule and his regime will arguably forever be remembered as one of the most brutal, inhumane and bloodiest dictatorships, his leadership will forever be engrained in Syrian history – the end of the Assad rule, however, is a pivotal moment for Syria and its people, the beginning of a new chapter and chance to pursue the freedoms and democracy they have long sought, and to live in safety again in their homeland.