This edition of The Review was co-edited with Faktoje as part of our partnership for the 2025 academic yar.

Maintaining Aid to Ukraine in the Face of Increasing Public Resistance

By: George Spector

On February 4th 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the justification that Ukrainian territory is a rightful part of Russia, a claim that scarily reflects the Cold War. Unlike where these examples succeeded, however, Putin has failed to achieve the ‘reunification’ of Russian territory as planned, in large part thanks to military and economic aid from abroad, particularly from the United States. The war has dragged into a stalemate, an ‘attritional war’, in the words of Gustav Gressel, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.1 The Ukrainian counter-offensive, which started on June 3rd 2023, has seen little success lately, consequent of the superiority of defense over offense for both sides in this conflict, leading to vast trench lines and an inability for neither Ukraine nor Russia to make extensive offensive progress.

As a result, both sides have turned to their allies for support in maintaining a drawn out war – Russia to its neighbors in the East, namely North Korea, and Ukraine to its Western comrades, especially the USA. Russia’s economy has adapted to the pressure of war, with $119 billion spent on defense in 2024, a rise of 90% from 2021 – and with support from North Korea arriving, they look prepared to fight a prolonged conflict and come out victorious. Ukraine, however, is deeply reliant on foreign assistance from the West, and as Hecht concluded, “without NATO’s contribution, [they] would not have been able to finance the war”. 

Modern-day Russian aggression is a clear regurgitation of Cold War rhetoric, and thus even a war against NATO in Europe does not seem outside of Putin’s scope of potential actions. The Western world must stand strong in support of Ukraine to prevent Russia from fulfilling its aims in Ukraine, thus perceiving the NATO alliance as weak and disunited and threatening the security of Europe as a whole. This amounts to maintaining foreign and economic aid to Ukraine to allow it to fight, and be victorious in, a drawn-out, attritional war. 

At present, the US has provided $84.7 billion in 2024, and Europe as a whole has provided $118.2 billion in the same time frame. In April, the US signed off a $63.1 billion aid package to Ukraine, with 68% of it military aid, 30% economic, and 2% humanitarian. Economic support (in terms of loans and funding to support the Ukrainian wartime economy) seeks to create a strong economic base in Ukraine to fund the war effort, and is clearly succeeding – the IMF predicts a 3.2% increase in Ukrainian GDP in 2024, thanks largely to foreign aid. Military aid, meanwhile accounts for weapons and ammunition, such as the 400 million rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades provided to Ukraine by the USA in just 2024 alone. NATO provides military support, tactical intelligence and training to the Ukrainian army, allowing it to replenish its stocks and continue repelling the Russian forces. This assistance is vital to their war effort.

However, in recent years, polls have indicated a public shift away from support for Ukraine, and actions in the US Congress have mirrored this effect. Assistance to Ukraine is looking less appealing to foreign voters, as mounting domestic concerns take precedence over issues taking place in a far-away country. As Krastev and Leonard noted, “European publics are not feeling particularly heroic” at the moment, and do not see a threat to their own national security as a consequence of events in Ukraine. Western leaders, therefore, must step up and teach their populations over the positive impacts of aid to Ukraine, before its too late. Assistance must be maintained in the face of growing popular resistance, as the security of Europe will be under grave threat if this fails to happen.

A study done by Fagan, Gubbala and Poushter in 2024 showcased that 31% of US citizens deem aid as ‘too high’ (compared to just 12% in April 2022), while a corroborating study by Clancy makes clear that only 23% of US citizens see supporting Ukraine as a ‘long-range foreign policy goal’. This is especially the case among young people influenced by social media and populist rhetoric, and portrays a worrying picture of declining support in the USA, Ukraine’s biggest donator, for foreign aid to the Eastern European nation. People no longer see Ukraine as a worthy enough cause to justify spending money on, money which could be spent internally instead. Indeed, 36% of US citizens say support for Ukraine hurts the USA’s national interest, in a study done by Wike, illustrating this point – US citizens are placing greater priority on domestic issues, among other concerns, than the Russo-Ukrainian war.

This growing public resistance to Ukrainian aid is mirrored in the actions taken by the US Congress and the election of Donald Trump. 154 members of the House voted in favor of an amendment to strike nonmilitary assistance to Ukraine from the latest supplemental package, not enough for a majority, but enough to showcase growing discontent with the situation. It would have cut US assistance to Ukraine by a sizeable amount, damaging their heavily US-reliant economy. Additionally, JD Vance, incoming Vice President, shares this view, long-expressing his opposition to aid to Ukraine, claiming the USA should focus instead on their internal, domestic issues. In light of Donald Trump’s victory on the 5th of November, this presents a concerning picture for the future of US aid to Ukraine. Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell, who does support Ukraine, admitted at a press conference that his party is ‘captive to the demonization of Ukraine’, an alarming statement considering his party now controls both the Senate and the House, and the future of US aid to Ukraine. Support in the US Congress is dwindling, potentially even more so in the coming months consequent of Donald Trump’s election and his promises to leave NATO and end the Russo-Ukrainian War in just one day, which would leave Ukraine in the lurch without substantial support and potentially being forced into a negotiated surrender. 

In Europe too, the same picture is being painted. An average of 41% of Europeans say that Europe should push Ukraine towards negotiating a peace deal, while only 31% say they should help support them fully to take back their territories. In Norway specifically, only 12% of 18-29 year olds see military aid as positive, showcasing how the younger generation is decreasingly viewing the Ukrainian war as a threat to their own national security. The youth, according to political scientist Oyvind, didn’t experience the Cold War at its height in the 1960s, and therefore don’t see the Russo-Ukrainian war as a big security threat to their own nations. Western governments must urgently illustrate to their populations how this is not the case, and that the impact of the war in Ukraine will have wide-reaching impacts, potentially threatening NATO as a whole. 

A poll in August of 2023 showcased how 90.4% of Ukrainians regard occupied territories for peace as unacceptable, and this combined with the fact that Russian actions are clear, flagrant violations of the UN charter showcases how important support for Ukraine is. While the Ukrainian people are determined to fight in defense of their country, and democracy as a whole, the West has an obligation to support their determination. For the US, foreign aid to Ukraine amounts to just 0.5% of GDP, compared to Estonia, where it’s around 3%, demonstrating how the USA has enough money to fund Ukraine while dealing with their own domestic concerns. Complimenting this, the USA gave Ukraine $80 billion to Ukraine from January 24th 2022 to January 15th 2023, while they spent around $125 billion per year on Afghanistan, and $270 billion per year on Iraq. The USA clearly has the economic capacity to fund Ukraine – arguments that money is being wasted on this when it should be spent on domestic concerns are unfounded; the USA has a tremendous budget, big enough to commit to both domestic and foreign spending. The public must be educated on this before it’s too late.

Putin is banking on ‘war fatigue’ growing in the West, as scholars Krastev and Leonard argue, leading to a decrease in aid for Ukraine and a Russian victory as a consequence. As such, this declining public support for assistance to Ukraine is exactly what the Russian leadership wants to achieve by fighting an attritional, prolonged, war. Wars often play out in the ballot boxes of foreign countries rather than on the battlefield – for example, both the French campaign in Algeria and the US campaign in Vietnam ended due to a collapse in public support as much as military setbacks. Declining public support has forced governments to change their stance on foreign conflicts, forcing settlements and negotiations. This must be avoided in Ukraine, for a settlement will only favor the Putin’s territorial aims. The threat of growing public resentment of foreign aid to Ukraine is substantial, and Western governments must find a way to rectify this and ensure aid is maintained over the coming years. More research must be done to determine a strategy to pursue in search of these aims.

The consequences of a Russian victory elucidate exactly why Western governments need to act to increase public support for Ukrainian assistance. If Putin questions NATO’s resolve to fight under certain conditions, the threat of global war would multiply, as political-scientist Kendall-Taylor claims. Indeed, in March 2024, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that “Russia’s borders do not end anywhere”, showcasing an expansionist and threatening policy from the Russia elite, and when coupled with the statement made by TV presenter and Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov in February 2024 that Russia is poised to “destroy” Poland, indicates exactly where Russian aims lie. The threat of Russia to its bordering NATO countries is a grave one, and the war in Ukraine must see a Russian defeat to hamper their territorial ambitions. 

The string of arrests of Russian agents planning acts of sabotage across Europe recently, especially in relation to the European Parliamentary elections in June, showcases their aims in undermining NATO and destabilizing it to the point where it poses less threat to Russian expansion. Finally, the threat of Russian expansion was catalyzed in May 2024, where they announced they would hold military exercises to rehearse the use of tactical nuclear weapons in combat. Putin’s aggressive expansionism is clear, and his aim to reestablish Soviet lands is also evident through his aggressive rhetoric towards Poland and the Baltics, claiming their NATO membership ‘affect[s] Russian security’. If Putin judges that NATO, and especially the USA in light of Trump’s election, lacks the resolve to fight, a European war does not seem improbable. As Estonia’s intelligence chief said in February 2023, “Russia has chosen a path which is a long-term confrontation… and the Kremlin is probably anticipating a conflict with NATO within the next decade or so”. Russia’s aims must be stymied in Ukraine, not just for the sake of the sake of the Ukrainian people, but for the sake of everyone in Europe.

Therefore, it is up to Western governments to teach their people of the benefits of support to Ukraine and the threat of a Russian victory on Europe as a whole. People need to see that a defeat for Ukraine will have wide reaching consequences, and as Jensen and Hoffman argue, one key way to achieve this is for the 311 members of the House of Representatives and 79 members of the Senate who supported the April aid package to go to the public and explain their reasoning, to help mitigate growing discontent. NATO, and the USA, must find a way to get around this discontent and sustain Ukraine’s economy and military to preserve democracy, not just in Ukraine, but in Europe as a whole. 

The US public especially must be educated of the threat of European war between Russia and NATO, a war that will involve US troops and be far costlier in American blood and money than the current war. As one-time critic of Ukrainian aid, House speaker Mike Johnson said “to put it bluntly, I would rather send bullets to Ukraine than American boys”. The general public, in the USA and across the whole of Europe, must understand the true nature of Russian aggression and the threat it poses to the national security of every nation. Only when this happens will resistance to foreign aid relax and the people see the benefits of supporting Ukraine. It is up to Western governments to act urgently to achieve this.

CIA Director Bill Burns claimed that “Putin’s war has already been a strategic failure for Russia – its military weaknesses laid bare; its economy badly damaged”. Indeed, the Russian economy has taken a hit, and its military operations have reached a stalemate, but without Western assistance is still on course to achieve victory in a drawn-out conflict. The West must ensure the war remains a failure for Russia, and the only way to achieve this is through educating their populations on the benefits of foreign aid to be able to maintain it, and limit Russian expansionism here and now in Ukraine, before it threatens NATO and the rest of Europe.

If they fail, and aid to Ukraine is curtailed in the coming years, the security of European democracy will hang in the balance. 

NATO in Eastern Europe: Why NATO Should Bolster its Presence in the Baltics

By: Elizabeth Wainer

Introduction:

The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) are pivotal to the collective security of NATO due to its geographical proximity to Russia. These states are currently unable to provide their own security and rely on the aid of NATO allies in the form of military personnel, assets and finance. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, fears of a ground invasion of the Baltics have prompted two targets for NATO for the need to be prepared for any subsequent initiation of Article V of the NATO Treaty – collective security - and the need to respond. Firstly, to increase its presence in the Baltics with Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) and secondly, to incite its members to commit more money and equipment to the Baltics due to their strategic importance. EFP is a deterrent mission undertaken in Baltic host countries, utilising the forces of other NATO nations and their resources. While this is undoubtedly the path to a stronger position in the Baltics and Eastern Europe as a whole, significantly more is yet to be achieved. With the growing threat from Russia allies should be put under much more pressure by NATO to ensure the regional and continental security from NATO achieves its objectives: collective security, interoperability, preparedness for war and most importantly, effective deterrence. 

Increasing NATO presence in the Baltics is vital. Through discussion of Baltic Air Policing, EFP, the strategic importance of the Baltics and the Suwalki Corridor, it will be argued that NATO needs to expand its spending and presence generally, but most critically in the Baltic region because of this strategic significance in the current and potential international context. This means that NATO will be proactive, prepared and efficient, as opposed to merely responding to situations as they arise.

Air Policing

Air policing in the Baltics is currently being used as part of the EFP in 8 missions, utilising NATO allies’ air force capabilities to act as deterrence. This makes it crucial to the security of NATO countries, and thus should be expanded upon, given the consensus on its importance strategically. The Baltic Air Policing tangibly demonstrates the significant strength of NATO air forces to Russia – 22,308 NATO aircraft to Russia’s 4,814 - to act as deterrence and show that NATO are prepared to defend this region. Furthermore, Hahnlein has assessed that ‘superior air forces are a key prerequisite for deterring Russia’ illustrating NATO’s need to continue to develop its 5th and eventually 6th generation fighters to be able to retain this numerical and technical superiority to act as an effective deterrence. As well as acting as deterrence, these aircraft would also be the quickest means available for countering a Russian attack – this was showcased following the invasion of Ukraine where RAF Typhoon’s were scrambled within 24 hours. Therefore, it is clear that obtaining a favourable position in the air domain – which NATO has definitively set out to achieve – is vitally important to act as both deterrence and responsive power. This conveys the need for greater presence in the Baltics, for both the security of the Baltic states themselves and for NATO due to its strategic significance and proximity to Russia. 

NATO’s forces have several profound chasms in their air strength concerning potential combat and, while deterrence is currently the main objective and something which NATO is well-prepared for, these weaknesses must be addressed for NATO to be an effective fighting force. The UK is currently developing ‘Team Tempest’ - a 6th Gen fighter – to come into service in 2035, as are other nations. This would be an asset to NATO’s forces since the current 5th Gen fighter – the F-35 – while being used in air policing so far and a ‘key part of a winning strategy’, loses speed in high-G turns compared to the F-16 and is particularly vulnerable in close air-to-air combat. 

A key issue with BAP is a projected decrease of 31.5% in size of combat aircraft fleets, alongside threats from newly elected US President Trump that the US will at least reduce funding, if not withdraw, from NATO. Given that US aircraft and personnel make up over half of NATO’s forces, these factors would severely impact NATOs ability to defend the Baltics and these effects can be seen in 2006, where following a US withdrawal of air policing in Iceland, Russian aircraft began intruding. In the Baltics, Russian intrusion is immeasurably higher even with NATO presence - in 2020, NATO scrambled aircraft 400 times to intercept unknown aircraft, with 90% being Russian - demonstrating the inherent need to maintain and expand, not decrease, their forces in the Baltics. This conveys how NATO needs to push defence spending beyond the agreed 2% by 2018 – which some affluent allies such as Spain fail to meet still – with a significant question remaining on whether even this is enough to deliver the capabilities for a strong forward defence NATO strives for. 

Interoperability

The need for cohesion within NATO to ensure that recommendations are implemented to the required extent is crucial, and currently not being reached. The EFP missions were created in response to the invasion demonstrating their role in deterrence, however they are not adequately being reinforced. Regarding the EFP programmes of BAP, it was agreed in the Madrid Summit (2022) to scale the initiative up from battalion to brigade-level units. The importance of gaining control of the air domain has been highlighted during the Russia-Ukraine War, yet Russia has regional superiority in the Baltic Sea region, and thus the intention to expand the EFP is excellent. However, while allied air forces have increased contributions to air policing and air shielding, only two EFP missions are planning to permanently upgrade to the recommend brigade-level units since it is up to the host country and the contributing nation. 

This need for cohesion and interoperability are at the heart of the NATO operation in the Baltics and needs to be strengthened to aid an expansion of NATO presence. Hahnlein states that no value is more important to NATO than cohesion and suggests that BAP would be more effective if all border restrictions were lifted. These restrictions prevent the optimal fluid movements of troops between NATO countries and hinder its efficiency. In January 2024, there was a declaration to make a military corridor to improve this, which would be greatly beneficial. Greater cohesion would increase confidence of the forces making them harder to intimidate, as well as enhancing the efficacy of EFP missions, as better relations between nations would incite expansion of ’foreign’ forces in host countries and allow for this essential increased presence. The idea of showcasing allied unity through cohesion is vital for deterrence, and the greater the presence there is in the Baltics the more this cohesion will be conveyed. This cohesion will signal that there will always be a collective response in line with Article V, as well as thwart Russia’s desire to divide the NATO Alliance to restore the Soviet sphere. This illustrates that a greater presence in the Baltics would promote the all-important cohesion and interoperability of NATO allies, showing the power of collective security as a deterrent.

This essential increasing presence in the Baltics not only includes personnel and aircraft, but ought to involve more modern infrastructure. NATO allies would be more willing to increase their presence in the Baltics if infrastructure was improved, and building more sensors, devices for closer integration of air defence and ground-based defence systems would increase interoperability by improving the ease at which allies could co-ordinate efforts. This would not only improve cohesion, but also better NATO’s ability to respond to threats in the Baltics, demonstrating the need for increased structural presence of NATO apparatus in the Baltics to support deterrence and the interoperability which is so crucial to this aim. 

Strategic Value

 In terms of strategic value to enlarging NATO presence in the Baltics, the importance is extensive. The Suwalki Corridor is one of the most pertinent demonstrations of the need to increase NATO presence. The Suwalki Corridor is only 64 miles wide and separates Kaliningrad from Russian-aligned Belarus, and contains very limited transport networks, conveying the need to preserve these. In Kaliningrad, Russia possesses Anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities which could pose a threat to NATO’s mobile strategy, and it is therefore essential that NATO increases its presence to counter this in case of a Russian attack. A2AD would be an issue for NATO due to the reliance on heavy reinforcements required to this region in the event of an attack which could be exploited. This was practiced in Operation Steadfast Defender in 2024, and although demonstrated cohesion of NATO allies, conveys the need for a more permanent and sizeable NATO force in the Baltics to overcome the issue of the Suwalki Corridor. The Russians could isolate the Baltics from the rest of NATO forces via this gap, and thus NATO would only be able to reach the Baltics by the Baltic Sea. However, this is fiercely controlled by the Russian Baltic Fleet and therefore illustrates the profound need for NATO to not only increase its BAP to control the air domain, but also the sea to prevent Russia from perceiving the Suwalki Corridor as an opportunity to exploit. Schut suggests that to prevent this being taken advantage of NATO needs more deterrence in the form of increasing visibility of troops at the Suwalki Corridor. This was undertaken in Operation Steadfast Defender with 90,000 troops from 32 NATO members, however this was only temporary to showcase strength, rather than retain these forces in the region to highlight any significant numerical permanent presence. Furthermore, there are a lack of hardened aircraft shelters in the region making the aircraft present vulnerable to attack in a conflict situation, demonstrating the profound requirement for NATO to improve its defence spending on infrastructure, especially defensive since it cannot thus be claimed by Russia to be provocative, as offensive build-up may be. This raises the issue of the conversion challenge of wealth into combat capabilities – since although there is increasing defence spending in the Baltics, this needs to be accompanied with an increased presence to utilise the new infrastructure. 

Preparedness

The Baltics do not have the depth – i.e. extensive infrastructure - to defend themselves due to this geography, which is another key supporting reason for an increased NATO presence to bolster their defence. The Baltics’ capitals lie only a short distance from the border – Lithuania’s capital Vilnius is only 18 miles from Belarus and 94 miles from Kaliningrad. This heightens the need for NATO forces to have a larger and permanent presence in the Baltics to be able to respond quickly, and as the Suwalki Corridor conveys, the need to deploy reinforcements quickly to resist a potential attack is of extensive importance to the security of the Baltics and Europe. A 2016 study suggested that Russian forces could reach Riga and/or Tallinn between 36 and 60 hours, illustrating definitively the need for fast, effective and cohesive response from NATO forces, which can only effectively be achieved by a permanent force in the Baltics. In contrast to the mere 18 and 94 mile distances the Russian forces would cover, NATO reinforcements have between 558 and 985 miles to cover from their peacetime garrisons in central Europe to the front lines in the Baltics. This is 10 times the distance needed to be covered in the Cold War, and convincingly illustrates the need for more localised forces to be able to reinforce the Baltics in sufficient time.

Most significantly, the issue of whether NATO is prepared for war in the Baltics is a good dimension in which to convey the need for an increased presence in the Baltics as a deterrent and as a preparatory measure. In response to the Russian invasion in 2022, NATO activated plans to make 40,000 troops and other assets available to SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander in Europe), followed by 4 new EFP missions. This shows that NATO is consciously addressing the need for strong military presence in Eastern Europe. However, as discussed regarding the Suwalki Corridor, the ability for these troops to be deployed in the Baltics should a Russian attack occur, and the region be isolated is reduced. Therefore, NATO should aim to either strengthen the Baltic countries’ own defence or, since the Baltics cannot provide a comprehensive response alone due to the costs, create a more permanent and sizeable Allied force presence in the region. NATO’s ability to respond rapidly to a threat in the Baltics is at the centre of its ability to deter, and thus speaks to the concept of preparing for war being the best way to avert it. This conveys the great significance of NATO presence in the Baltics as a means of both ensuring NATO is prepared to support the Baltic states under Article V, while minimising the likelihood of this being necessary, being a coherent force regardless.

This is supported by the identification in an assessment published earlier this year that the most worrying scenario for war is a rapid seizure of territory in the Baltic region. When we consider that this has been pointed out by several European leaders, that there is currently due to the geographical context a local force imbalance favouring Russia, and that the Suwalki Corridor needs to be reinforced it is clear that NATO should increase its presence in the Baltics. This is because while this scenario is the ’most likely’, it does not inherently mean it is going to occur, and therefore NATO needs to prepare and deter Russia while it has the opportunity and Russia is weakened by fighting in Ukraine, rather than consistently only responding to actions, such as the annexation of Crimea or the invasion of Ukraine. For example, while Germany has offered 30,000 troops and 85 ships and aircrafts to NATO, it is only able to mobilise these in 30 days which showcases that, given the style of risk which is threatening the Baltics – a rapid seizure of territory – NATO needs a presence in the Baltics itself. Additionally, any NATO operation to regain lost ground would require establishing air superiority and control of the Baltic sea, reinforcing the need for an expansion of BAP, as well as a pre-existing strength in order to respond quickly, once again illustrating the clear need for NATO to expand their Baltic presence.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is evident that NATO is extending its involvement in the Baltics since the invasion of Ukraine, with 4 new EFP missions, increasing availability of troops to SACEUR and aiming to increase defence spending and infrastructure. However, NATO currently only respond to Russia’s offensive actions, as opposed to increasing their presence in the Baltics of their own accord to act as a deterrent. The value of a stronger, more cohesive and permanent NATO force in the Baltics cannot be overstated; it increases the ability of NATO to respond to a potential Russian attack and ensure the Baltics do not become isolated, maintain control of the airspace and deter Russia by showing a strong, unified force which wholly represents the collective security which underpins NATO. There are many challenges, most notably cost of aircraft and infrastructure, to achieving this however the benefits of an ever-increasing presence in the Baltics are more substantial than the costs this would incur, particularly if the deterrence is utilised to its fullest extent to deter Russia, thus saving money from engaging in a war. Ultimately, the Baltics, including the Suwalki Corridor, are a critical strategic region of the NATO alliance, subject to local force imbalances which need to be addressed by an increased presence, as well as being in prime position to act as the foundation for a fortified, defensive (to crucially not be misinterpreted and provoke Russia) and deterrence-based NATO operation.