Executive Summary: 

Emerging from the aftermath of the genocide in 1994, Rwandan women have been instrumental in fostering a new equitable social framework. However, efforts to capitalize on these transformations have caused unintended consequences, requiring urgent redress. External forces have made Rwandan women vulnerable; from neighboring hostilities unraveling in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to worldwide pandemics, UN Women must be alert and ready for action. Protecting the rights of Rwandan women is at the core of UN Women’s mandate: integral to its gender equality mission, and the preservation of its reputation and partnerships. The recommendation to UN Women is to establish a women-led Track II diplomatic body to ultimately link Track I and Track II channels in multifaceted negotiations. The operation requires grit, but provides the best option to reaffirm UN Women’s commitment to women’s rights in Rwanda. 

Background Information: 

Tensions between the Hutu ethnic majority and the Tutsi ethnicity culminated in an egregious genocide in 1994, and the establishment of a Tutsi-led government under President Paul Kagame’s party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (BBC, 2019). The genocide epitomized the gendered implications inherent in civil wars (Newbury and Baldwin, 2000a). Central to army officer Théoneste Bagosora’s coordination of the Tutsi genocide was the desire to reclaim the patriarchy that had disintegrated in the preceding decade (Williamson, 2012). Thus, systematic violence against women (in specific Tutsi women) became common practice (Taylor, 1999). 

Hutu militia affiliated with the Interahamwe rebel group and soldiers of the Forces Armées Rwandaises, (FAR) orchestrated mass sexual violence (Human Rights Watch, 1996) with total reports of genocidal rape amounting to 500,000 (Baines, 2003). Women’s economic stability was deplorable, with GDP per capita decreasing by 31% (Hodler, 2019). The majority of Hutu and Tutsi women reliant on male relatives for monetary support were now destitute. The 1995 Rwandan Government Report found that in negotiations concerning the civil war, such as the Arusha Peace Accords 1993, women’s voices were largely neglected (Balikungeri, and Ingabire, 2010). 

However, these direct impacts failed to shape the architecture of post-genocide Rwanda. (Aili Mari, 2016.) The genocide forced 2,000,000 people to flee, the majority being male genocidaires facing persecution from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Consequently, 60% of the remaining population was female, (Warner, 2016) many of whom replaced their male counterparts in peace reconstruction efforts under the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (Balikungeri, and Ingabire, 2010). The international disarray caused by the maltreatment of women during the genocide prompted a shift in international law in the form of the UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women's Peace and Security in 2000 (United Nations Security Council, 2000). The Rwandan Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (MIGEPROF) followed suit, launching the 1325 National Action Plan in 2010. 

The UN Women Rwanda Office is currently operating under representative Ms. Jennet Kem (UN Women Africa, 2022). The organization has aligned itself with the African Union Agenda 2063 calling for the “effective participation of women in decision-making areas.” (African Union, 2021). To achieve this mission, UN Women Rwanda has fostered significant partnerships with the government, private sector, and civil society. For example, UN Women has publicly backed the Rwandan government’s 2003 Constitution, Article 10 Preamble 4, mandating a 30% quota across ‘all decision-making organs’ (Republic of Rwanda, 2003). UN Women, in partnership with the National Women Council, monitored the parliamentary elections in 2013 and local government elections in 2016 to ‘ensure compliance’ with the quota. Before these measures, women made up 21% of parliament, compared to the current rate which stands at 64% (UN Women, 2018). However, the quota primarily consists of Tutsi women, there to elevate President Kagame’s RPF government. (Njoku, 2018). Additionally, by garnering international appraisal from allies (the United Kingdom and the United States) as the ‘most significant political development of the last thirty years,’ the quota has abused women to create a ‘smoke screen’ that obscures the RPF’s undemocratic practices (Bush and Zetterberg, 2020). For instance, the imprisonment of Diane Rwigara in 2017 for her presidential bid against President Kagame was largely overlooked (Piscopo and Shames, 2020). 

Alternatively, the 1995 Beijing Conference on the Empowerment of Women emphasizes an economic approach to supporting women (Cronin-Furman, Gowrinathan, and Zakaria, 2017). In line with this, UN Women has actively supported the Pro Femmes/Twese Hamwe multiethnic collective organization, established in 1992 and chaired by Jeanne d'Arc Kanakuze (UN Women, 2021). However, these organizations have offered a momentary increase in household income rather than initiating long-term changes to women’s rights in Rwanda (Zakaria, 2017). For example, UN Women’s 2016 BuyFromWomen initiative, targeting 5,000 women farmers, is criticized. (UN Women Africa, 2018). Incomes are unsustainable and vulnerable due to volatile farming markets, and COVID-19 shocks (UN Women, 2024b). These initiatives remain widely apolitical, focusing on an economic approach that turns a ‘blind eye to the [political] structures of women’s repression’ (Cronin-Furman, Gowrinathan, and Zakaria, 2017). 

Alternatively, UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, has called for the combination of Track I and Track II diplomacy to mediate “today’s complex conflicts.” (Melanne Verveer and Anjali Dayal, 2018). Historically, UNIFEM (now merged with UN Women) advocated this policy in Rwanda (UN Women, 2021). For instance, during the Northern insurgence in 1996 initiated by the Democratic Forces for the Liberations of Rwanda (FDLR), women engaged in informal dialogue, effective in persuading their sons and husbands to disarm. 

However, external forces pose a threat to these advancements. Regional tensions between the DRC and the FDLR have escalated. As the weaponization of sexual violence against women has previously been used in conflict with the DRC, UN Women must be alert. (Naidoo, 2000). Additionally, MIGEPROF and UN Women’s Rapid Assessment (2020) concludes that Rwandan women were disproportionately negatively affected by COVID-19 in terms of future economic activities and income sources. (Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion, 2020). 

UN Women Interests:

Firstly, UN Women’s mission calls for creating an environment where ‘every woman and girl can exercise her human rights and live up to her full potential’ (UN Women, 2024a). This mission extends to concrete action in Rwanda as articulated in the UN Women’s Global Strategic Plan (2022-2025) (United Nations Development Program, 2024). 

Secondly, women’s rights in Rwanda impacts UN Women’s reputation. The genocide was considered ‘one of the darkest chapters in [UN] history’ for its intervention paralysis, says Guterres (Onu Italia, 2023). By engaging in Rwanda, UN Women can build back confidence in the UN, and reaffirm its reputation as the ‘global champion’ (UN Women, 2024a) in the advancement of the rights of women. 

Thirdly, UN Women’s interest in maintaining strong regional partnerships (ie. MIGEPROF) is in jeopardy. Failure to promote gender-based policy change may threaten the very survival of these integral partnerships, straining the legitimacy of UN Women (United Nations Development Report, 2024).

Policy Options: 

Criteria: 

The criteria used to assess the policy options will be as follows: a) how successful is the policy in achieving UN Women’s mission; b) countering unintended consequences, and c) feasibility. 

Policy Option 1: Promote the 30% quota, adopting a gender-relational approach. Continually strengthening and legitimizing the 30% gender quota stipulated under Article 10 of the 2003 Constitution via sustained vocal advocacy and backing (UN Women, 2022). This would include the commitment of a selected body of UN Women representatives, led by Rwanda Office Representative, Jennet Kem, to provide continuous guided managerial support to women within the quota. UN Women can subsequently leverage its position to advance a gender-relational approach in endorsing (via capacity building) ethnically diverse female candidates in the July 2024 Deputy elections and beyond. Subsequent provision of full UN protection for Hutu and Twa ethnic minorities in the quota becomes imperative, considering President Kagame’s Tutsi-dominated government (Aili Mari, 2016). 

Engaging with this policy directly aligns with UN Women’s core commitment to gender equality and would sustain its long-term support of the quota since 2003. Broader Rwandan society has actively supported the initiative, making implementation highly feasible, by already securing local support (Burnet, 2011). Close collaboration with female quota representatives such as Paula Ingabire, Member of Parliament, and Minister of Information, would strengthen UN Women’s intergovernmental partnerships and bolster its reputation nationally (Inclusive Security, 2000). Finally, adopting the gender-relational approach directly addresses the unintended consequence of Tutsi ethnic domination within the established quota (Myrttinen, Naujoks, and El-Bushra, 2014). 

Nonetheless, the quota has drawn international scrutiny. (Berry and Lake, 2020) If the gender-relational approach is not adequately implemented, UN Women would be indirectly perpetuating the RPF’s grip by legitimizing their Tutsi-dominated government. Effectively advancing the gender-relational approach to the quota will require persuasion and stable collaboration with President Kagame. This proves challenging, given the RPF government has often been characterized as a ‘well-camouflaged dictatorship,’ (Ungoed-Thomas, Barnett, and Barnett, 2024) limited in its desire to dismantle the RPF’s dominion and denying the pursuit of undemocratic practices. 

Policy Option 2: Creation of a UN Women and Pro Femmes joint program 

Actively pursue the creation of a joint program with Pro Femmes, to provide robust financial and managerial support to multiethnic women-led initiatives. Definitively, UN Women could funnel muscular financial backing to the joint program via the Official Development Assistance fund, allocating 1% per annum (United Nations, 2023). This investment provides greater financial flexibility for all 51 organizations under the collective to engage in women-led empowerment initiatives or microfinancing opportunities. Management of the joint program and publication of monthly reports could be led by UN Women Rwanda representatives (ie. Jennet Kem.) Finally, UN Women could leverage its partnerships with MIGEPROF and the National Women Council to garner government endorsement of the joint program. (Newbury and Baldwin, 2000b). 

The policy aligns with UN Women’s central mission: dismantling financial/political barriers to gender equality by actively backing empowerment schemes (Burnet, 2015). UN Women’s partnerships would be transformed, specifically with women community leader Jeanne d’Arc Kanakuze. (United Nations Development Report, 2024). In the long term, stronger partnerships can bolster UN Women’s trustable reputation at both a community and governmental level, which has clear appeal. By engaging political entities like MIGEPROF, economic programs of the Pro Femmes can be politicized thereby targeting unintended consequences of apolitical empowerment initiatives such as BuyFromWomen. 

Nevertheless, the policy faces drawbacks in its feasibility. UN Women’s previous joint initiative with MIGEPROF launched in January 2019, was hindered due to difficulties in collaborative data collection efforts. (One UN, 2019). Furthermore, the inability to secure sustained funding caused significant delays in the planned initiatives. These potential collaboration and financing risks could resurface in a joint program with Pro Femmes, thereby impeding the strength and capacity of the policy. 

Policy Option 3: Establish a women-led Track II diplomatic body and formal link with Track I negotiations. 

Alternatively, UN Women could establish a women-led Track II body to ultimately advance an initiative linking Track I and women-led Track II diplomatic channels in multifaceted negotiations. UN Women can engage with their domestic partnerships with women NGOs and representatives to form the women-led Track II body. This includes Rwanda Women’s Network, founded by Mary Balikungeri, and Pro Femmes (Mwambari, 2017). Once the body is created, the formal linkage between Track I and women-led Track II diplomatic groups can be achieved through UN Women-backed communication channels (Christien, 2020).

The option reflects much promise in achieving UN Women’s mission. First, it dismantles barriers to gender inequality by providing an ‘informal’ platform by which women of civil society can more easily voice their concerns and see these concerns play out in government negotiations (UN Women, 2023). Second, by working with partners such as Rwanda Women’s Network, and President Kagame’s government, UN Women can further strengthen its locally established partnerships and reputation. Unintended consequences are tackled by adopting a gender-relational approach that engages with diverse NGOs (ie Pro Femmes) that ensures women of the Tutsi elite do not over dominate parliament. 

However, in terms of feasibility, the option may face backlash. Studies conclude that due to the multiplicity of Track II actors, there is a risk of lack of coordination and organization which could harm the body’s reputation and ability to penetrate high-level negotiations (Mapendere, 2000). Additionally, the women-led Track II body may run the risk of perpetuating smoke screening habits as President Kagame may accept the policy to gain international appraisal but abuse it as a veneer to orchestrate undemocratic practices. 

Policy Recommendation: 

UN Women’s most viable option is the final; establish a women-led Track II body that links with Track I initiatives, engaged in multifaceted negotiations spanning security, economic, and gender-focused issues. This recommendation ensures the most success in terms of the criteria, by establishing an inclusive space in which the concerns of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa ethnic women are effectively addressed and politicized. 

Concretely UN Women should:  

Facilitate the establishment of a women-led Track II body: 

The body will be created using UN Women’s partnerships with women NGOs and prominent female leaders including but not limited to; Rwanda Women’s Network, Pro Femmes, and women leaders such as Odette Nyiramilimo, former Minister of State for Social Affairs from 2000-2003. (Inclusive Security, 2017). Together, these respective stakeholders can politicize the women-led Track II body (Cronin-Furman, Gowrinathan, and Zakaria, 2017) and promote a gender-relational approach by ensuring the membership of diverse women ethnic groups. Garnering government backing will be integral to the body’s survival. UN Women can leverage its partnerships with MIGEPROF, to funnel support and apply direct pressure on President Kagame to comply. 

Linkage with Track I diplomatic bodies: 

Upon formal establishment of the women-led Track II body, UN Women can initiate the linkage with Track I diplomatic groups. This involves establishing regular dialogue channels through Jennet Kem’s team, tasked with scheduling online and weekly in-person meetings. UN Women must ensure the flexibility of these meetings as urgent periods of conflict may necessitate heightened dialogue. Escalating tensions between Rwanda and the DRC provides an opportunity. Washington has persuaded the DRC to consider dialogue with Rwanda, a process that the women-led Track II body could complement (Liffran and Tilouine, 2024). 

Monthly Reports 

UN Women representatives must conduct and publish monthly reports overseeing the Track I and women-led Track II linkage. This can enhance transparency, and make UN Women partners (UK, Sweden, and the US) more aware of smoke screening habits. If this unintended consequence persists, UN Women could garner international pressure under the mandate of Resolution 1325 to deter President Kagame’s smokescreen.   

By: Matilde Roquette