Editor's Disclaimer: The WSSB understands that the recent APEC summit brought forth discussions between President Xi Jinping and President Donald Trump on a potential easing of rare earth element export restrictions. Given that this article was written before these latest developments, the WSSB will continue to monitor the progress of the deal, as it is yet to be formalised on paper, and will accordingly update readers on the progress and potential impacts of this agreement.

On the 9th of October, trade war tensions were reignited, with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce announcing the strengthening of its export controls on rare earth elements (REEs). This move is seen as the strictest yet, as China already regulates seven REEs, and has now added planned export controls on five more elements, which are due to be imposed from the 8th of November (Carr, 2025). Furthermore, the Ministry also announced new extraterritorial control measures, involving the requirement of an export license for products that contain materials originating from China, or if Chinese technology was used in their production process (Huld, 2025). This decision holds high significance, as it simultaneously reflects evolving geopolitical security dynamics and intensifies pressures on the Western defence sector’s already highly undiversified supply chains. 

From China’s perspective, its reasoning for increased export controls is grounded in efforts to uphold its national security. This is supported by an official press release highlighting the dual-use properties of REEs, and how, in the past, they have been applied both directly and indirectly in sensitive sectors, such as military operations. The spokesperson reiterated that such applications bear negative impacts on China’s national security and interests, as well as undermine international peace and stability (MOFCOM, 2025). As a result, it is clear that the Ministry of Commerce will generally reject export license requests for products bound for overseas military end-users, effectively creating an export ban for REEs used for such purposes (Huld, 2025). Therefore, according to the Centre for Strategic and International Security Studies (Baskaran, 2025), the policy is aimed at preventing any contribution of Chinese REEs or associated technologies in overseas defence supply chains. 

This could pose significant implications for Western defence sectors, notably enterprises in the United States,  as REEs are crucial for the production of several defence technologies. For example, in the US, they are an essential component in the F-35 fighter jet, Virginia and Columbia class submarines, Tomahawk missile, as well as complex radar systems (Todd Lopez, 2024). Therefore, such intense export controls heighten already present vulnerabilities, with research estimating that China is currently contributing to its defence capabilities at a rate five to six times faster than the US (Baskaran, 2025). The European Union’s defence industry is also at risk, as the measures could further destabilise supply chains and lead to inventory deficits. This is supported by the finding that more than 80% of major European companies are indirectly tied to Chinese rare earth producers through intermediaries such as US technology firms (Banin et al., 2025). As a result, negative implications could be felt in terms of weapons provision for Ukraine (Gehrke and Oertel, 2025). 

In conclusion, China’s tightening of export controls on REEs should not only be seen as an economic measure amidst the ongoing trade war, but also a strategic decision aimed at enhancing its own national security. It demonstrates the increasing significance of control over resources, and its potential to pose widespread security implications.  

Furthermore, in light of the recent Trump-Xi summit, the two parties have reportedly agreed on pausing China’s latest export controls on REEs; however, nothing has been formalised yet. The WSSB will continue to monitor developments.